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vRESUME
Au cours des dernieres annees, l'evolution des nouvelles technologies a change notre facon
de travailler. Les grandes entreprises, les gouvernements et me^me nous en tant qu'individus
dependons des ordinateurs et des reseaux. Ils sont devenus une partie importante de nos
vies personnelle et professionnelle, et representent maintenant une infrastructure critique au
me^me titre que les reseaux electriques, tant la quantite de donnees numeriques et devenue
importante.
Cette evolution continue avec la montee en puissance de l'informatique en nuage. Dans
ce nouveau modele, on peut acceder a distance a des logiciels, a du stockage numerique ou
bien a des infrastructures sans contrainte, les machines etant regroupees en centre de donnees
dont l'acces se fait de maniere transparente par internet.
La securite de l'information est devenue primordiale en informatique, et en particulier
dans l'informatique en nuage au fur et a mesure que les entreprises y exportent leurs donnees
sensibles. Ainsi, le niveau de securite au sein des centres de donnees doivent e^tre au moins
equivalent a ce que les entreprises ont dans leur propres installations.
Nous appellerons middlebox, un element du reseau ayant pour fonction d'inspecter et de
ltrer les paquets, dans un but autre que la retransmission de paquet. Un pare-feu est un
bon exemple de middlebox.
Les solutions existantes pour securiser l'informatique en nuage prennent rarement en
consideration la traversee de middleboxes, en eet, elles se concentrent principalement sur
l'isolation des tracs entre les dierents clients du centre de donnees. De plus, les solutions
prenant en compte l'application de middlebox le font d'une facon qui ne permet pas la mi-
gration des nuds au sein du reseau.
Notre projet consiste en la creation d'une architecture permettant l'application de poli-
tiques de securite par client. Les politiques de securite seront des sequences de middlebox
que le trac des clients devra traverser, puisque c'est de cette facon que la securite est
generalement assuree dans les entreprises. L'application de ces politiques de securite devra
prendre en compte la pluralite des clients ainsi que la migration des machines au sein du
reseau. Plus precisement, le trac devra traverser les middlebox dans l'ordre specie par le
client, sans en traverser d'autres. L'application des politiques doit e^tre automatiquement re-
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conguree lors de la migration des machines virtuelles.
An de realiser ce projet, nous utilisons une architecture de reseau programmable an
d'appliquer ecacement les politiques. Dans cette architecture, le plan de contro^le est decouple
du plan de donnees ce qui permet de centraliser la gestion du reseau. Ainsi, les clients de
notre architecture denissent le niveau de securite qu'ils veulent voir e^tre applique a leur ma-
chines. An d'identier une politique de securite, nous utilisons un identiant d'application
(AppID), qui represente une cha^ne de middlebox a traverser.
Nous supposons que l'hyperviseur a la capacite d'inserer cet AppID au sein des paquets,
lorsqu'une machine en emet. Au moment ou le premier paquet d'un ux atteint un commu-
tateur du reseau, il est transferer au contro^leur de reseau, qui a pour ta^che de lire cet AppID.
En fonction de ce dernier, le contro^leur determine la cha^ne de securite a appliquer au trac.
Nous denissons dierents marqueurs (que nous nommons EEL-tags) an d'eectuer le
routage des paquets au travers des middlebox. Ceux-ci sont subdivises en gTag et iTag. Les
gTags correspondent a des types de middlebox, tandis que les iTags correspondent a des
instances de middlebox. Ainsi, une cha^ne de securite est denie par une cha^ne de gTag. Les
itags correspondants sont utilises an d'eectuer le routage des paquets au sein du reseau,
en denissant la prochaine instance a traverser.
En ajoutant ces EEL-tags aux paquets, notre modele procure une facon simple et au-
tomatique d'appliquer des politiques de securite, tout en s'assurant de leur coherence malgre
la migration des nuds. De plus, notre modele permet au reseau d'e^tre divise en petites
zones, chacune d'entre elle etant contro^lee par un contro^leur de reseau specique. Lorsque
les machines emettrice et receptrice se trouvent dans deux zones dierentes, l'application de
la politique de securite peut e^tre repartie entre les dierentes zones.
Nous avons developpe un prototype que nous avons teste dans un environnement simule.
Bien que de nombreux aspects de notre implementation requierent de l'amelioration an
d'obtenir une solution commerciale, cette experimentation nous a permis d'obtenir une preuve
de concept de notre architecture. Nous avons notamment pu observer que les politiques de
securite restent coherentes malgre la migration de nuds.
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ABSTRACT
During the past decades, the evolution of technology has drastically changed our ways.
All major enterprises, government services, and even us as individuals, rely on computers
and networks. They have become a part of our personal and professional lives and represent
nowadays a critical infrastructure as the amount of data stored numerically as well as its
sensitivity has grown considerably.
This evolution continues with the rise of cloud computing. In this new model, one can ac-
cess software, digital storage or infrastructure without constraints, as the hardware is pooled
in remote data center, accessed seamlessly via Internet.
Security has become a major concern in computer science in general and in the cloud in
particular, as enterprises moving to the cloud would have to export some of their sensitive
data. Therefore, the cloud providers need to oer a level of security which matches what the
companies have in their on-site installations.
A middlebox is a network appliance that inspects and lters packets for purposes other
than packet forwarding. A rewall is a good example of a middlebox.
Existing solutions to secure the cloud rarely take in consideration the traversal of middle-
boxes, as they focus mainly on creating an isolation between the dierent tenants. Further-
more, the solutions considering the traversal of middlebox sequences do so in a way which
does not permit the migration of nodes.
Through our project, we aim to create a cloud architecture allowing the application of
security policies per tenant. The security will consist in sequences of middleboxes to be
traversed, as it is the way commonly used by enterprises to secure their networks. The en-
forcement of security policies will have to take in consideration the multi-tenant aspect of
the cloud, as well as the node migration.
Particularly, trac should traverse middleboxes in the sequence required by the tenant
and should not traverse unnecessary middleboxes. The enforcement of policies should be
automatically re-congured due to VM migrations.
In this work, we propose a method of leveraging the current Software-Dened Network
(SDN) architecture for ecient policy enforcement. SDN is a form of network architecture
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in which the control plane is separated from the data plane, allowing the network to be
centrally managed. Therefore, the tenants dene the security design they want to apply to
their Virtual Machine (VM)s, or groups of VMs. In order to identify the security policies,
we use an Application ID (AppID), which actually refers to a chain of middleboxes to be
traversed.
We assume that the running hypervisor has the capability to add this AppID into the ow
when a VM emits packets. When the rst packet of a ow reaches a switch, it is forwarded
to the network controller, which in turn retrieves the AppID from the packet. Based on the
AppID, the controller determines the chain of middleboxes to be traversed.
In order to route the packets through the middleboxes, our model denes labels to apply
to each ow of packets (EEL-tags). The latter are divided in generic EEL-tag (gTag) and
instance EEL-tag (iTag). Each gTag corresponds to a middlebox type, and each iTag corre-
sponds to a middlebox instance. The security chain is dened by a chain of gTags. The iTags
are added to the packets in order to route the packets across the network, dening what is
the next middlebox the packet must be sent to.
By using the EEL-tags, this model provides a simple way to automatically enforce security
policies, while keeping them consistent despite node migration. Furthermore, we allow the
network to be partitioned in dierent zones, each zone being ruled by a specic controller.
When the VM source and destination belong to dierent zones, the enforcement of security
policies can be spread between the dierent zones.
We created a prototype of our model that we tested in a simulated environment. Although
many aspects of our implementation will have to be improved in order to obtain a viable
commercial solution, testing our prototype provided us with a proof of concept. Particularly,
it showed how the security policies remain consistent despite node migration.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Denitions and Concepts
Security has become a major concern during the past decade, as computers and networks
are becoming a critical infrastructure. All major enterprises and government services, and
even us as individuals, rely on them. The amount of data stored digitally as well as its
sensitivity has likewise grown considerably.
Thereby, security breaches lead to disastrous business and legal consequences, now more
than ever. In this very rst chapter, we are dening several terms which are important to
our project.
1.1.1 Middlebox
A middlebox is a network appliance performing functions other than standard functions
of an IP router or a switch. It lies between the source and the destination and transforms,
inspects, lters, or manipulates trac in order to provide services such as Network Address
translation, Intrusion Detection or Firewall services.
1.1.2 Cloud Computing
The idea of cloud computing is almost as old as the computer itself. Its principle is to
have the user's computer, Smartphone, tablet or any internet-connected device acting as a
front-end displaying an application, as the resources used to do so are in fact located in
remote servers.
These remote servers are often Virtual Machine (VM) located on physical servers inside
data centers. Companies specialized in leasing their data centers are called cloud providers.
This leasing can be done both in a Business to Business (B2B) or Business to Customer (B2C)
model.
The cloud providers are often classied in three main categories, depending on the model
of service they are oering [28]. The rst model is the Infrastructure as a service (IaaS),
which is the most basic model. The IaaS model consists in providing Virtual Machines to
the clients whom will have to install operating systems as well as their applications on top
of the VMs. Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Rackspace Cloud are examples
2of IaaS. Secondly, there is the Platform as a service (PaaS) model where only a computing
platform is provided to the client, on top of which the client's application is directly installed.
Examples of PaaS include Microsoft Azure and Google App Engine. Finally, the last model
is the Software as a service (SaaS), which is the most widely known among internet users. In
this model, the end-user is using directly the software installed by the cloud provider, which
could be an online e-mail service, for instance. This last model diers slightly to the previous
as the cloud users are the customers of the application, in comparison of the two rst models
where the cloud users are often businesses. The Google Apps are a good example of the last
model.
In the IaaS model, the customers to dynamically scale up and down to as many ma-
chines as needed inside the cloud in a \pay-as-you-go" manner. The clients can dynamically
provision resources to meet the current demand by adjusting their leasing of resources from
the cloud provider. Customers can also then use more ecient hardware without being
preoccupied by its maintenance, cooling and storage.
In each model, the cloud providers can use multi-tenancy, where virtual machines from
multiple customers can share the same sets of physical servers and the network, in order to
reduce the waste of resources. However, economies of scale are so important that their users
benet from both a more ecient and cheaper solution.
Due to the combination of an ever growing number of people connected to the internet,
the constant evolution of computer science along with the decreasing of hardware prices, the
use of cloud computing instead of classic networks architecture has recently become a reality.
1.1.3 Software-Dened Networking
Cloud computing is not the only change that has occurred during the past few years, the
way we approach networking has also begun to shift. Indeed, as a recent network architecture
proposal has drawn signicant interests from both academic and industry [11]. In this new
architecture, the control plane is decoupled from the forwarding plane and the entire routing
system is built as a distributed system. The control plane, running on one or more servers
in the network, is overseeing a set of simple forwarding elements.
Traditional routers follow an integrated design where the control plane and data forward-
ing engine are tightly coupled in the same box. It usually results in overly complicated control
plane and complex network management. Due to this high complexity, equipment vendors
and network operators are reluctant to employ changes and the network itself is fragile and
hard to manage. This is known to create a large burden and high bearer to the new protocol
and technology developments.
In this new architecture, the logic coded in the controllers dene the way they instruct
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Each ow entry contains a set of actions such as modifying, forwarding or dropping packets.
The main task of a forwarding element is then to apply these actions to the matching packets.
Therefore, the forwarding logic is completely centralized, which makes it easier to program
the behavior of the whole network as a single entity. This is why one often refers to this new
architecture as Software-Dened Network or Software-Dened Network (SDN).
1.2 Security Problems in the Cloud
With all new technologies comes a load of uncertainties. Despite the promising poten-
tials of the cloud model, one of the major burden to its widespread adoption is security, as
customers are often reluctant to export sensitive data or use computation power that reside
outside of their network's frontiers as it would make them accessible to persons foreign to
the company. It is common to believe that things are safer in our possession, even though
enterprise networks are often less secure than the cloud provider ones [26] as they can often
dedicate more resource to the security.
1.2.1 Security Threats
More precisely, cloud computing security can be breached by several actors. In the cloud,
there are the cloud provider and the tenants. A tenant could be attacked by the cloud
provider or by other clients. The cloud provider could be attacked by tenants. Our project
does not consider the situation where the provider is malicious. Indeed, we suppose that the
cloud provider is honest. We further suppose that all network appliances are compliant and
secure.
Our project aims to secure the trac of a tenant. In this situation, this trac could rst
be threatened by other tenants. Indeed, malicious tenants could be willing to access data
of other tenants or to gain access to their network by using techniques such as ARP cache
poisoning or IP spoong. Furthermore, a misconguration of routing appliances could lead
to a breach in condentiality. The other threat comes from inside the tenant's network itself.
This threat is the most important one in security today, as malicious software can enter the
enterprise network downloaded by the employees browsing the internet.
In the enterprise network, the trac is secured by the traversal of middleboxes along the
path. Our project aims to create a framework enabling the traversal of middleboxes despite
the elastic nature of the cloud, meanwhile providing isolation of trac in order to prevent
the risk of an attack by another tenant.
41.2.2 Security Requirements
The threat analysis leads us to dene requirements for an ecient security solution.
Isolation. The multi-tenant nature of the cloud raises a lot of concerns, since a direct
competitor to the company could be using resources of the very same physical server. The
cloud provider has thus to ensure a complete isolation between the dierent tenants. This
isolation have to be guaranteed rstly at the hypervisor level, as several VMs should be
running on the same physical server without ever accessing each other's data, or aecting
the performance of one another. Also, the isolation must be ensured at the network level as
we must prevent rogue VMs to be able to sni packets intended to other VMs. In our work,
the isolation at the hypervisor will be assumed but considered out of scope.
Security in the Enterprise Network. Network security is a key aspect in designing
modern applications. The policy management in a secure enterprise network today can
therefore be quite complex. For instance, it may require restricting a machine containing
sensitive data to be accessed only by a small group of users, or preventing external trac
from directly reaching internal servers. The actual realization may involve servers having
complex communication patterns governed by network access control, such as the traversal
of several middleboxes before being reached. When enterprises decide to move to the cloud,
they want to keep the same requirements regarding their policy management. It would be
possible for the network manager of the enterprise to implement the middleboxes and the
routing policies on VMs in the same way as before moving to the cloud. However, one
of the goal of moving to the cloud is to escape the burden of network administration and
conguration. Furthermore, the type of security policies in place in enterprises networks are
often quite similar as it consists in the traversal of several middleboxes.
Scalability. Today's data centers are already containing hundreds of thousands of servers
[7], and this number is very likely to increase during the forthcoming years. Furthermore,
the customers can request the creation or the removal of VMs in order to meet their needs.
Therefore, the networks are highly elastic and can reach an immense number of VMs. Because
of that, networks architecture has to be scalable in order to ensure a good performance
whatever number of VM is running in the network.
Node Migration. In order to optimize the resources in the data centers or for mainte-
nance reasons, cloud providers often have to migrate VMs from a physical server to another.
Migrations are used in order to pool the active VMs and then reduce the number of turned on
5physical servers inside the data center, thus reducing cost. Migrations also reveal themselves
handy when there is an hardware problem on a physical server, for example. The VMs run-
ning on this server are moved to other physical servers and the alleged decient server can be
turned o and replaced. The impact of node migration on the network is important. Indeed,
since the VMs are potentially moving from a physical server to another, the routes between
them are also impacted, and the topology of the network is thus changing. Most importantly,
the end points of the routes are changing. This causes the need to recongure the network
with each migration. The cloud provider must ensure that the routes are consistent with the
roles and permissions of each VM.
Elastic Networks. Due to recent changes in the use of computers and Internet, the net-
work architecture has drastically changed. It appears now that in data center, the networks
have become huge elastic networks which can scale up and down as the tenants provision VMs
to meet their needs. Furthermore, the VMs themselves migrate from one physical servers to
another, which makes the network volatile in addition to be elastic. We are now dealing with
networks that are dierent from classic ones, as the nodes do not have as many constraints
regarding the number of nodes as well as their positioning. Manual conguration of such
networks would be time consuming and not responsive enough. It could furthermore lead to
misconguration and/or malicious actions. An automated way of managing the resources is
thus essential.
1.3 Purpose of the Research
It is in this context that our work takes place. We have seen that security is a major hurdle
to the cloud adoption, and that the evolution of the network conguration and characteristics
makes it hard to congure and administrate.
When tenants decide to migrate to the cloud, they want to keep a similar security level,
and it can become complex to implement when their policies are transposed in the cloud.
Due to the versatile nature of these elastic networks, it is not possible to implement these
routes manually in a similar way to what is done in the enterprises, as the number of routes
would be way too important. The manpower needed would be too important and it may
lead to misconguration and errors. Furthermore, it would not be reactive enough to cope
with the constant provision of new VM as well as the live migrations.
As a result, the goal of our research is to :
1. Design a network architecture allowing the automatic enforcement of security policies
in a cloud environment ;
62. Implement a prototype of our proposed solution ;
3. Study the viability of our solution by testing the behavior of our prototype.
1.4 Outline
In this introduction, we exposed the context in which this research is made, as well as
the problem raised by a massive cloud adoption towards which we may be heading. In the
next chapter, we will provide a state of the art of the dierent ways currently possible to
distinguish distinct tenants trac and apply security policies at the network level. Building
on this analysis of the current technologies, we will present the algorithms and models that
we produced in order to meet the requirements inherent to our project. After the theory
comes the practice, as we will explain our implementation choices for the prototype as well
as for the test strategy. This chapter will also hold the proof of concept we obtained. Lastly,
the ultimate chapter will be a retrospective on the work that has been done and will expose
the conclusions we draw on our project.
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TRAFFIC SEPARATION AND SECURITY POLICIES
The current chapter provides a literature review of the main techniques that can be used
in the cloud in order to provide a security solution for the cloud's tenants. As evoked in the
previous chapter, cloud computing has rapidly risen and is now an important trend as many
believe it is the future of computer use. However, this raises many concerns regarding the
security around the cloud. As a consequence, the research and development has been intense
and the technology has been dramatically evolving.
Across our analysis, we will provide a detailed description of the technologies, by present-
ing both their practical and technical aspects. We will expose their drawbacks and advantages
relatively to the point we are discussing, before giving our conclusions on their performance
in a cloud context, and what would be their impact on both the cloud provider and customer.
In a cloud environment, we have seen that any architecture must provide enough scala-
bility in order to operate as the network is scaling up and down. Furthermore, the process
has to be automatic in order to reduce the error-prone human interventions. Last, but not
least, comes the need of an architecture being migration tolerant as the node migration is a
particular characteristic of the cloud.
Our goal is to provide the cloud's tenants with a security solution. In order to do so, we
want to distinguish and isolate the tenants' trac from one another, meanwhile enabling the
application of security policies in the form of middlebox sequences to traverse ; this is why
the literature review is articulated as follow.
In the rst part, we will analyze the dierent ways existing in order to distinguish the traf-
cs in a multi-tenant infrastructure. We will rst review the solutions achieving the isolation
based on network separation and then, the ones which are using the trac's characteristics
to distinguish the dierent ows.
In the second part, we wonder what's the best way to apply security policies. In order to
do so, we rst analyze the dierent ways to dene a security policy. Subsequently, we will
review the work on the enforcement of these policies.
Finally, the conclusion will summarize and close the chapter, recapitulating the main
drawbacks in actual solutions while enlightening the key improvement that need to be
achieved in order to secure the cloud at the network level while providing distinct security
policies to each tenant.
82.1 Trac Separation
Our goal is to provide security policies to the tenants of the data center. Before dening
what a security policy is and how to enforce it, we need to determine what we should apply
these policies to. This is why we review the literature in order to see how the distinction of
trac can be achieved.
This very rst section of the chapter will review these technologies, from the less precise
ones to the ones oering the best granularity. We will thus begin with the isolation techniques
based on the creation of networks or sub-networks. We will further study the solutions based
on the characteristics of the trac.
2.1.1 Network Isolation
Historically, the rst use of grids and cloud computing has been made by important com-
panies willing to reduce their costs and increase their computational capabilities by pooling
their resources in remote data centers. Due to the evolution of technology in both hardware
capability and virtualization techniques, this model has become more and more interesting
from a nancial point of view [13].
Incidentally, the cloud computing has become a business model in itself, in which a
company (the cloud provider) would create remote data centers in order to lease its resources
to another company. In this model, several companies, or tenants, could use the remote data
centers simultaneously.
In order to protect the tenants assets, their data must be separated from one another,
both on a physical server and on the communication channels. We will see in the forthcoming
sections what measures have been put in place in order to do so.
Divide et impera - Physical Isolation
Some companies like government aliated companies are handling very high sensitive data
and the commercial oers of the early years of the cloud did not meet their requirements
as these oers did not provide much guaranteed security. However, cloud providers then
began to look more closely on how to provide a highly secured environment as they realized
it consisted in a new market. In this context, new oers were quick to appear [3, 5].
In order to provide such high security levels to a tenant, one simple and yet ecient
concept has emerged: using dedicated appliances in order to literally isolate the tenants from
one another [2, 4]. The cloud provider assigns specic hardware to each tenant who requires
the highest level of security. Therefore, the tenant's VMs are running on dedicated servers,
which are physically isolated from the other tenants.
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networks and trac.
Indeed, this physical separation prevents one tenant's data to reach one of the other
tenants' machines. It is then impossible for a malicious tenant to try and capture data
from another tenant by eavesdropping on the network. Furthermore, data paths are totally
separated from one another as they run through dierent appliances, which makes impossible
any disruption made by another VM on the network, such as an Identity Spoong attack or
simply a Denial-of-Service attack.
However, the use of such an architecture in a context where the network may be composed
of hundreds of thousands of nodes raises many questions. To begin with, the dedicated
hardware, even though it may be inactive at a given time, has to be monopolized for the
tenants who need the highest security. In other words, the pooling of resources would be
limited which may lead to an oversized network. Indeed, the dedicated servers could have
hosted other tenants' Virtual Machines. However, these VMs would have to be located on
other servers, contributing to the waste of resources, as the servers would not be loaded at
their maximal capacity. Furthermore, as the use of the cloud would grow, we can easily
imagine that the expansion of such a rigid architecture would become harder and harder to
maintain and congure. Such a solution would cost even more as the cloud would grow,
which goes against one of the reason why the cloud is widely used: reducing the waste of
resources and identifying economies of scale.
For instance, we could imagine several companies with high security standards migrating
to the cloud. It is unlikely that for each company, their VMs' load would be exactly the
capacity of a whole number of physical servers. Therefore, each unused capacity portion of
the servers would add up, leading to a bigger waste of resources. As the number of tenants
would grow, the waste of resources would also grow.
Providing isolation in this manner leads to a very rigid architecture where the dierent
tenants networks are partitioned and isolated from each other. In the case where the man-
agement of this architecture would be administrated by the cloud provider, the multiplicity
of networks, middleboxes as well as routing policies regarding middlebox sequences traversal
congurations would be more than puzzling. To date, no management architecture allows to
dynamically administer the network in such a fashion.
Lastly, one major drawback of rigid architectures in the cloud is the migrating behavior
of the nodes.
Thus, going back to the example of a small company migrating to the cloud and using
dedicated servers, the cloud provider could need to migrate nodes in order to replace hardware
for example. However, the migration of these nodes has to be done to other dedicated
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hardware in order to preserve security. Furthermore, the migration of a node inside a tenant's
network may require a routing conguration in order to maintain the middlbox traversal.
Once again, no architecture allows to automatically recongure the cloud automatically upon
these migrations, and a manual reconguration is simply inconceivable in networks as big as
the clouds' ones.
As a conclusion, such a segmentation is ecient on the one hand, as it provides com-
plete isolation between the dierent tenants while making possible the conguration and
enforcement of security policies in each of these networks. However, on the other hand, the
outcome of the application of that method would be a very rigid architecture where resources
are duplicated instead of being pooled. This would lead to an oversized network which is
problematic in a context where there are potentially hundreds of thousands VMs across the
data center.
These problems would lead to the decrease of the economies of scale and to a waste or
resources, hence increasing the cost of this solution. The cloud computing is a fast-evolving
eld and such an architecture is not likely to be put in place as the evolution of cloud
management software and the virtualization technologies are now more mature as they were
at the cloud premises. The scalability problem of this solution makes it unsuitable for the
cloud today.
Segmentation by VLAN - Virtual Isolation
Physical segmentation is not the only way to separate several networks from one another.
Indeed, the Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) technology, as dened in the IEEE 802.1Q
protocol, makes it possible to create several virtual networks independently to the network
topology. A VLAN consists of a group of hosts behaving as if they were belonging to a single
network segment, regardless of their physical location.
The VLAN technology is traditionally used to congure and administrate networks in
enterprises as well as in the research eld, as they provide the ability to easily congure
and isolate a group of hosts in a virtual network. Their widespread utilization makes them
inescapable in network management nowadays, and it is not rare to nd them in recently
proposed cloud architecture [19, 9].
In this section, we will discuss the use of VLANs in order to create a secure isolation in
a cloud network. First, we will review the use of classic VLAN, where VLAN membership is
dened by port or MAC address. Then, in the second part of the section, we will focus on
VLAN stacking, or VLAN Q-in-Q, which extends the 802.1Q protocol.
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Classic VLAN
The development of the Internet during the past decades has led to bigger and bigger
Local Area Network (LAN). The switched networks, although suited for most networks, are
problematic when the network is too big. Indeed, a broadcast domain too important leads to
an unstable network, as ooding the network will consume a lot of bandwidth. Furthermore,
another drawback of these networks are the fact that all users can see all devices in the
network.
This situation has led to the emergence of VLANs, which virtually create several networks
on one topology. There are two main ways to congure VLANs. First of all, assuming they
support VLAN technology, each switch of the network has a table linking the VLAN IDs to
its ports. By linking the switches accordingly, one can create several networks which are a
sub-part of the original broadcast domain. Lastly, the VLAN membership can be based on
the station's MAC addresses. That method is more practical as it is independent from the
node's position in the network.
However, using solely VLANs to isolate the network has some major limitations. Indeed,
when we have a closer look at the VLAN header 2.1, we can see that the the VLAN ID eld
is a 12-bit tag, as dened in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
802.1Q standard [8], which implies a limit of 4096 distinct coexisting networks. This number
is too low when we take in consideration that a major adoption of the cloud would create
immense data centers.
Furthermore, if several policies have to be put in place for a tenant, the number of
required sub-networks would be even greater. Thus, VLAN technology cannot be used as it
is a limitation to the scalability of the cloud model.
Figure 2.1 VLAN header
VLAN Q-in-Q
As the Internet has evolved, the need to use VLANs in order to tunnel packets that were
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already tagged has appeared, as a result to ever bigger LANs. This is why the IEEE 802.1ad
standard includes the denition of VLAN Q-in-Q, also called double tagging. As its name
suggests, double tagging consists in using two tags instead of one [6]. This allows the service
providers and the end user to concurrently use VLANs in a heterogeneous network.
As a consequence, The double tagging theoretically increases the numbers of possible
networks from 4096 to 16777216 dierent networks, even though it was not the main goal
of this technology. However, classic routers do not have the capability to analyze these two
tags as a couple, so it does not help the scalability problem of the cloud. Furthermore, the
routers still have to be congured manually, which is another issue in an environment which
needs to be automated.
Conclusion on VLANs
We have seen through this section the drawbacks of using VLAN technology in today's and
tomorrow's clouds. Due to its wide spread use among enterprises and researchers, it is normal
that they were used to secure growing data centers. However, the cloud is ever growing and
has now entered a phase where the main requirement is scalability, which VLAN fails to
provide.
Furthermore, the economies of scale are requiring a simple and automatic management
system. Once again, the VLAN does not qualify as a potential technology because of its
manual conguration on the routers along the paths. Consequently, dividing the trac using
the classic Virtual Local Area Network technology is an inadequate solution for the cloud.
Mixed Segmentation
As neither the physical nor the virtual separation are satisfying the cloud's requirements,
it is time to evaluate the combination of those two.
A recent cloud architecture proposal [15] is using VLANs in addition to a particular
physical topology in order to isolate tenant networks from one another. The whole cloud
network is indeed divided in several parts: one core domain, in which all trac arrives to the
data center, mainly composed of routers, and several edge domains, where the tenants VMs
are located.
The division in multiple domain compensates the scalability problem of the VLAN tech-
nology, as the number of nodes are then reduced and can t the maximum number of VLANs.
In the case of a tenant's nodes being in several edge domains, another identier is added to
the tenant's trac: the cnet ID. Furthermore, in each edge domain, each network is isolated
by VLAN. When a tenant's VMs are located in more than one edge domains, the cnet id is
used in combination with the VLAN id to make the connection between the virtual networks.
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Moreover, critical competitors can be isolated from one another as they can be set in
dierent edge domains. Due to its architecture, the scalability will not be as impaired as it
is when the physical isolation is used.
This work is a good example of the diculty of using VLANs to isolate and administrate
tenants' networks inside a data center. The scalability issue the VLAN technology has led
here to the need of separating the network in several edge domains as well as adding a new
identier.
Providing a scalable architecture isolating the tenants networks from one another is there-
fore possible. However, it is a rather complex solution which is not automated, and on top
of which we wish to add the automatic enforcement of security policies.
2.1.2 Flow-based Segmentation Architectures
In this section, we will analyze the segmentation techniques that are not based on a
particular technology, but all have one thing in common: they use the ow characteristics to
dierentiate tenant trac and thus enforcing security policies. These characteristics could
be the destination IP address, the source MAC address, the protocol type, or any variable
which could characterize the ow of packets.
We further subdivide these technologies in two categories, which we call Gateway-based
techniques and Network infrastructure-based techniques. The rst ones have dedicated for-
warding elements which act as gateways, and that are responsible for detecting the ows and
enforcing policies. In the second category, all routing elements can potentially act as policy
enforcement devices as well as forwarding elements.
Gateway-based Architectures
We analyze here the solutions where the trac goes through forwarding and policy apply-
ing elements. These elements are responsible for detecting, redirecting the ows and applying
security policies. Figure 2.2 simply illustrates how the trac can be dierentiated by the
forwarding elements placed between the core domain and the other domains. In this gure,
these elements are represented in blue.
The solution studied in the previous section [15] is designed in the same way. In order
to achieve the ow separation, the forwarding elements lies at the frontier of what they call
Edge Domains and the Core Domain.
A central controller has the mapping of the running VMs and can then distribute them
into the Edge Domains, as the Core Domain will mainly act as a transit domain. The
forwarding elements lying at the frontiers of the domains are connected to the controller
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Figure 2.2 Gateway-based segmentation
which hold the policy databases.
Therefore, when a tenant's packet is detected at the frontier, the according routing rules
are set, based on the security policies. Furthermore, particular rules can be set based on the
identity of the emitter or receiver of the packet. The application of middlebox-based security
policies will be analyzed in section 2.2.2.
In other solutions found in the literature [19], the gateway-based model diers slightly
from what is described above. Special forwarding elements named pswitches are spread across
the network. As they process a packet, the pswitch communicates with the centralized policy
controller in order to know how to steer the packet across the network.
The pswitches can match the ows based on the ve tuple (source IP, destination IP,
source port, destination port and protocol type).
Gateway-based techniques present a drawback as the gateways act as bottlenecks for the
trac, which is bad for the scalability of the solution, considering that the data centers host
large networks that generate an important amount of trac.
Network Infrastructure-based Techniques
In the previous section, the trac was identied by gateways acting like sentinels across
the network. In this subsection, we analyze solutions where the ows are identied and
processed by all the elements of the whole network infrastructure.
15
During the past few years, important advances have been made that have completely
modied the way we approach networking. In classical routing, the high level decisions (the
control plane), such as deciding which port to send the packet out to, as well as the packet
forwarding itself (the data path) occurred on the same appliance. However, recent research
tend to take the control path out of the switches and centralize it [14, 12, 22].
Therefore, the logic on which the decisions are made is located in the centralized controller,
as the switches are simple forwarding elements devoid of any logic.
2.1.3 Openow
One particular Software-Dened Network protocol [22] draws the attention of the whole
community. In the OF protocol, the data plane and the control plane are totally separated.
As a packet is received by a switch, it forwards the packet to the controller which analyzes
the packet and decides how to process the packet. Then, the controller adds an entry to the
ow table of the switch. The ow entry contains the requisite information in order to match
the packet as well as the action to apply to the matching packets. As the switch receives a
second packet belonging to known ow, there is no need to communicate with the controller
and the packet is immediately processed.
Consequently, several logical networks can be dened by specic characteristics and will
then be isolated from each other. The precision of the ow-denition depends on the imple-
mentation. The rst generation of OpenFlow (OF) switches, the ow can be matched based
on a 10-tuple [11]. The matching elds are shown on gure 2.3. In such an architecture, the
granularity of the isolation is as good as the precision with which the ows are dierentiated.
Figure 2.3 The header elds matched in the OF protocol
Using this segmentation technique allows to have a centralized controller which orches-
trates the trac in order to apply the right policies [17, 23]. It is also possible to have several
controllers, each one of them directing a slice of the network [27].
Recent research [21] have worked on creating and distributing a Network Information Base
which contains the information regarding the nodes and the network topology. By created
a distributed model, they ensure a suitable scalability regarding the cloud requirements.
Furthermore, it is possible replicate the controller in order to reduce its load and improve its
performance.
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As a conclusion, a ow-based segmentation of the trac provides a good isolation, scala-
bility and automatism. The logic of the routing is concentrated in the central controller which
automatically pushes the rules down the switches based on a wider logic. Software-Dened
Network seems at this point the most relevant technology in order to match the trac whom
we further want to apply the security policies to.
2.2 Security Policy Enforcement
As an enterprise migrates to the cloud, they primarily want to reduce their costs while
beneting of a better and more secure solution [20]. In an on-site installation, companies
usually benet from security policies set and maintained by the IT department.
This section is divided in two parts. We will rst review the literature on how the security
policies are dened in recent cloud architecture proposals. Then, we will review the various
possible ways of achieving the enforcement of these policies.
2.2.1 Security Policy Denition
Our work focuses on the enforcement of security policies at the network level. In this
section, we will consider the security policies as they are dened in numerous recent work.
We believe that it will help us dene what we want to achieve in our solution.
First of all, we will consider security policies as routing rules, or more precisely, allowed
and forbidden actions. We will see what they mean as well as how they relate to tenant
isolation.
In the second part, we will consider the security policies as implemented by a chain of
middleboxes. We will analyze how these chains of middleboxes are dened and how the
security policies are applied.
What do the policies target
Many people call their mother on the phone. Sometimes, we chat with a stranger at the
bakery shop. Yet, it would be awkward for the stranger from the bakery shop to call your
mother. This is because in life, as well as in networking, there must be rules set in order to
allow or deny certain communications.
These rules are important in networking as they ensure the security of sensible data by
restricting access to some machines. However, in order to apply these rules, we need to
determine a set of constraints to match. These constraints however depends on the type of
trac isolation put in place.
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In recent work [17, 18], research projects aim to provide a declarative policy language
for managing the enterprise networks (FML/FSL). As it is done in the OF technology, the
matching of the ows is made on a tuple representing multiple characteristics of the ow,
such as target and source address. The matching elds dening a ow in the FML are shown
on gure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 Characteristics of a ow [17]
The dierence from the other works relies on the request property. Indeed, in this lan-
guage, the authors deem that the policy engine must be capable of determining whether a
ow is a request or a response to a request.
This research provides a good abstraction of the possible security policies that can be
applied. However, this new declarative language is done in order to simplify the management
of the network. Therefore, it must suer from an over-complicated form when it has to be
used by the tenants on a day-to-day management of their cloud.
Bellessa et al. propose NetOdessa [23] in order to tackle the error-prone conguration
of explicitly writing rules about individual hosts. They build on previous research [10] on a
distributed host-level dynamic policy monitoring system, in order to extend it to the network
layer.
The network manager can write basic policies about groups of hosts which are then
translated and enforced at the network layer. The host agents then monitors the behavior
on the nodes in order to detect whether the policies are consistent or not. The data gathered
is used to rene the enforced policies by taking actions in order to rectify the application of
the policy.
The main focus of the work [23] is the detection of violations. In its design, the NetOdessa
proposal allows the denition of a violation as a policy. The given example is the one of the
denial of the use of SSH by anonymous hosts. As an anonymous host is trying to communicate
through SSH, the host-level monitoring system will detect the violation and prevent the host
to do so.
Another advantage provided by this solution is to detect the compromised nodes without
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having to shut down the whole group of hosts the compromised one belongs to. The dynamism
brought along by the host-level monitoring system allows the detection of a suspicious and
potentially malicious change on a node, and then actions can be taken at the network level.
This dual surveillance is what is particular of this work, compared to the other research on
the subject.
We have already evoked the paper [15] on secure cloud computing several times. In
this architecture, where the network is divided in a core domain, on which are bound edge
domains, the forwarding elements placed on the network frontiers are distinguishing the ows
based on their membership to a tenant network.
The authors decided to apply policies based on the identity of the destination of the
packets. The forwarding elements then act as a rewall which can block and even redirect
the packets based on the identity of the destination machine.
A problem occurs when two VMs of one tenant communicate with each other and security
is required. Indeed, if the two VMs are in the same VLAN, the trac will not go through a
forwarding element and thus no policy can be applied.
The solution requires for VMs to be placed on separated VLANs when a security policy
must be applied. However, what would happen if all communications of the VMs must be
run through a middlebox? Using one VLAN per machine does not seem appropriate in this
case.
We have reviewed several work in this section. Some are more focused on the policy
denition [17, 18] while others focus on the ease of network management and security [23, 15].
In every case, we analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the solution.
After having analyzed the target of the policies, we will focus on the policies themselves
in the next part.
Policy Denition
Now that we know what are the target of the policies, we want to have a closer look on the
policies themselves. We aim at analyzing the recent cloud architecture proposals providing
security in order to have a better understanding on the use of middleboxes.
We begin by continuing and nishing our analysis on the paper [15] where the policies are
applied per user. The policies can consist in ltering the trac, applying Quality of Service
treatment or route the trac through middleboxes.
There is yet no evocation of the traversal of a sequence of middleboxes.
The distributed host-level dynamic policy monitoring system proposal [23] goes one step
further in the elaboration of policies.
The policy is here dened by several rules, each rule being a combination of a condition
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and an action. As the condition is satised, the action is applied. The conditions are set of
statements written using the Resource Description Framework [1]. An action to be taken is a
change in the network triggered by the inference engine. An action can be the set of routing
rules as well as dropping a ow, or routing a ow through a middlebox.
Even thought it takes in consideration the traversal of middleboxes in their design, it is not
specied how the routing itself through the middlebox is going to be achieved. Furthermore,
there is no evocation of the traversal of a sequence of middleboxes, which we believe is key
in order to achieve a level of security comparable to the one oered in an on-site installation
of an enterprise network.
FML/FSL allow the network manager to dene groups of hosts and congure policies.
The constraints that can be applied to these groups of host are of ve types: allow, deny,
waypoint, avoid and ratelimit. The allow constraint, as its name suggests, is used in order
to explicitly dene authorized communications. The deny constraints, almost as obviously
as the latter, means that the ows associated to this constraint in the policy will be denied.
Waypoint requires a ow to pass through a particular node of the network and "avoid" will
forbid a ow from passing through a particular node. Finally, the keyword ratelimit will
allow for the network manager to set the maximum bandwidth of a link.
This policy conguration allows for the tenant to easily dene simple rules in a similar
fashion as what is done in an on-site enterprise network, where a member of a department
D1 can reach the department D2 but must be strictly prevented from communicating with
D3, where the sensible information lies.
This paper is the only one to specically address the problem of middlebox traversal. The
centralized controller holds the policy database which contains the sequences of middleboxes
to be traversed. A policy is of the form : Location, Trac Selector, Sequence. The sequence
being the sequence of middleboxes.
The Start Location denes the physical location from which the packets are emitting.
The Trac Selector will use the ve-tuple in order to dene which ows the security policies
must be applied to.
This paper is interesting as it is the only one considering the enforcement of a sequence
of middleboxes in a cloud network.
2.2.2 Policy Enforcement
The goal of our work is to provide a secure solution to the tenants as they migrate to
the cloud. From the beginning, we identify the security policy as a sequence of middleboxes.
Indeed, we want to provide the same level of security in the cloud as in the enterprises, as
the middleboxes are widely implanted.
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We have seen in the previous section that pretty much all the solutions support the
middlebox traversal in their architecture, even though they don't allow the traversal of a
middlebox sequence.
In this section, we go one step further by analyzing how the policies described in the
previous section can be enforced at the network level.
Rigid Architecture
We begin this section by analyzing how the policies can be enforced when we have a rigid
architecture, and what are the problems which can occur.
Topological segmentation can physically separate several networks from one another.
Enforcing security policies in this context is possible. Indeed, the middleboxes that have
to be traversed can be located in the tenant's network before setting the routes accordingly.
Each tenant's trac is then going through the right middleboxes and the trac is secured.
However, for each tenant and each network, there has to be an instance of each middlebox,
or at least of each middlebox that has to be traversed. This duplication of middlebox is
severely impairing the scalability of this model. Furthermore, the load of the middleboxes
is not optimized as they would be dedicated to a particular tenant whether his trac is
important or not.
For example, we can imagine a small company with high security requirements that is
using the cloud to run its applications. Several middleboxes would then be monopolized for
this tenant, even though these middleboxes are far from being used at their full capacity
in terms of trac load. Furthermore, the expansion of the data center would once again
contribute to an important waste of resources.
Some cloud architectures proposals suer from a rigid architecture [15]. In such cases,
the network is partitioned in smaller domains, and the forwarding elements enabling the
enforcement of the security policies lies at the frontiers of the networks.
In this situation, the middleboxes have to be connected directly to the forwarding ele-
ments. The problem here is the rigidity of the structure. All middleboxes are concentrated
at the frontier, and all secure trac must also run through these gateways. This has for
eect the creation of bottlenecks in the network, imputing the scalability of the system.
The paper [19] also suers from this drawback, but in a lesser extent, this is why we
decide to review it in the next section.
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O-path Middleboxes
In this section, we consider the situation where the middlebox can be relatively anywhere
in the network topology. We will see how the presented solutions achieve to route the packets
from a source, to a destination, and throughout a sequence of middleboxes.
FML, proposed by Hinrichs et al. [17] provides the capability to dene policies including
waypoints. The waypoint constraint will force a ow to go through a particular node before
reaching its destination.
When the packet is detected, the correspondent security policy is retrieved. Then, the
policy enforcement engine will calculate the path from the source to the destination, respect-
ing the constraints of the policy. In the case of a waypoint, the route will be calculated
considering the traversal of the required waypoints. Then, the route will be enforced at the
network level.
Thereby, this solution can be used in order to enforce a security policy in the form of the
traversal of a middlebox. It is nonetheless not explicit if the algorithm allows the routing
nor the traversal of a sequence of middeleboxes, but even if it does not, we believe that the
capability could be added by implementing minor changes to the algorithm.
Another drawback is more obvious when we consider the migration of nodes. Indeed,
the waypoint denes a particular node to be traversed whereas a security policy requires
the traversal, for instance, of a rewall. However, it may happen that there are several
rewall instances running inside the data center. Moreover, as a Virtual Machine migrates,
the routing throughout the same rewall as the one traversed prior to the migration is likely
to be problematic, as the traversal of another rewall instances could potentially be more
ecient.
Due to the fact of the lack of an enforcement mechanism and the application of sequences
of middleboxes, as well as the low tolerance to node migration, we believe this solution can
not be used for our purpose, even though it can be a source of inspiration.
One of the recent works on cloud architecture [19] proposes an architecture in order to
dynamically apply security policies, and to address the limitations of current middlebox
deployment mechanisms. In this model, the policy is dened as a sequence of middleboxes.
The main goal is to enforce security policies to each dierent trac. The forwarding
elements, which are the gateways, are used to steer the trac towards the right middleboxes
by analyzing and encapsulating the packets. The gateways are spread across the network,
only a limited number of routers act as gateways.
The trac is encapsulated in Ethernet packets in order to force its path through the right
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middleboxes. Indeed, the middleboxes are plugged directly into the pswitches, those modied
switches placed across the network. As a packet arrives to the network, it is detected by a
pswitch which encapsulates the frame into another Ethernet frame addressed to the pswitch
in which the middlebox is plugged.
Thereby, the packet is routed through the network as any other packet, using no particular
mechanism, as the destination address of the frame is no longer the address of the destination
machine, it is the address of the next middlebox ingress switch.
Once the packet has reached the middlebox ingress switch, the encapsulation is no longer
needed. Furthermore, many middleboxes use the header information in order to analyze a
packet [25, 16]. This is why the packet is decapsulated before being sent to the middle-
box, and in case there is another middlebox towards which the packet must be sent, a new
encapsulation is operated.
This model used to present an advantage as it enabled the use of only a limited amount
of dedicated routers as gateways, which is interesting in the context of making an existing
network more secure with minimal changes made to the infrastructure. However, our study
focuses on what should be the state of the art solution to meet the challenges that cloud
operators have to face, even if it means building the architecture from scratch.
Furthermore, The repeated encapsulation and decapsulation of packets lead to a waste of
resources, which is critical in a cloud environment. In addition, the migration of nodes has
not been considered.
We can see that across the pswitches, the routing is done based on the next hop. We
consider two VMs, VM1 and VM2. When VM1 migrates and starts emitting packets again,
the routing based on the next hop is problematic in case of overlapping routes between VM1
and VM2, before and after migration. Indeed, the rules in the pswitch will still match the
source and destination elds of the two VMs, even though their location has changed.
The policies do not remain consistent despite the migration of nodes, as the problem is
addressed in a static context.
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2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the literature in order to realize what has been done in
Cloud Computing in order to enforce security policies at the network level. Particularly,
we considered the criteria of scalability and automatism in a context where the network is
shared by multiple tenants and the migration of nodes is omnipresent.
We rst considered the dierent existing solutions in order to dierentiate the trac
between the dierent tenants, as the isolation between tenants is the basis of a secure network.
There are many solutions allowing trac separation. However, the precision of these
solutions varies greatly, as the isolation can be made from a complete separation of physical
network [2, 4] to the ow-by-ow separation provided by the matching of shared character-
istics of the packets [22, 19, 17].
The recent breakthroughs in Software-Dened Networking have let us to believe that the
most suitable technology for our project today is the use of the OpenFlow technology [22, 11]
as it provides an isolation per ow as well as a automatic centralized control of the network.
We then analyzed the way security policies are dened and enforced. The security policies
are dened in several ways. Some solutions focus on the isolation only [24] or the routing rules
and their consistency [23], whereas other architectures put more emphasis on the traversal
of middleboxes [19, 15].
Furthermore, we have studied the mechanisms allowing the traversal of middleboxes.
Solutions providing a rigid architecture where the middleboxes are topologically constrained
[15] is not satisfying for us, as those concentrations of middleboxes can act as bottlenecks in
the network.
Only a few solutions [19, 17] allow the routing throughout middleboxes whose location
is not constrained, to a certain extent. However, these solutions either fail to provide the
traversal of sequences of middleboxes [17] or their policies do not remain consistent through
the migration of nodes [19, 17].
None of these solutions are suitable to our requirements, as we consider the traversal of
sequences of middleboxes in a context where the migration of nodes is not unusual. Yet, they
pave the way towards the security of the cloud networks.
Through this literature review, we studied the dierent ways possible in order to achieve
the enforcement of security policies in a multi-tenant cloud network. We are now able to build
on this knowledge in order to build a solution of our own in the course of the forthcoming
chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING AN ELASTIC ENFORCEMENT LAYER
The previous chapter provided a literature review on the techniques used nowadays in
order to secure the tenants networks by implementing security policies. Although these
solutions are tackling that particular problems, we believe they are not suitable for today's
multi-tenant cloud networks. Indeed, these solutions are not remaining consistent through
node migrations. Furthermore, many of the current solutions show scalability issues.
In this chapter, we build on what we have learned in the previous chapter in order to
develop our own solution. Innovation means enhancing a product, increasing its performance
or providing new or ameliorated services. This is what we try to do in this project. We
want to give the cloud provider the possibility to dynamically enforce security policies in a
multi-tenant cloud network.
In order to do so, we will rst dene the use cases in which we want to provide a solution.
It will help us dene the behavior we want our solution to adopt.
Then, we will analyze and rene our requirements regarding the solution we plan on
developing, based on the use cases as well as on the literature review. We will analyze each
aspect of the problem that we want to address, and also precise the scope of our study. Next,
we will precise how we plan on meeting each requirement, and which technology we plan on
using.
Lastly, we will present the complete owchart of the algorithm of our solution, which will
include and summarize the proposed solutions for each requirement. We will also go through
the use cases once again in order to see the behavior of our algorithm.
3.1 Use Cases
Every technology is built in order to answer a particular problem or at least to facilitate
the management of a practical situation. This is why we believe that the analysis of practical
use cases is key in order to dene the most relevant answer to provide.
In this section, we will study three use cases, which are key in order to dene our require-
ments. We believe they reect the needs of the tenants when they move their networks and
applications to the cloud.
When a cloud provider is running a tenant's VMs, those Virtual Machines could be located
anywhere inside the data center, on any physical server. Based on the type of machine, or
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based on the type of trac which is emitted, the trac from one VM to another is submitted
to certain security requirements, dened by the tenant. These requirements correspond a
chain of middleboxes that have to be traversed. Therefore, the route between two VMs has
to be redirected in order to go through these particular middleboxes.
We will name \ingress switch" and \egress switch" the switches traversed right before
and after the middlebox. In our case, we will consider the ingress and egress switches to be
the same.
The 3.1 provides a simple view of the abstraction of the Cloud which could be presented
to the tenants. Indeed, our goal is to dynamically apply the security policies, regardless of
the location of the dierent VMs inside the data center.
Figure 3.1 Communication between two VMs
3.1.1 The Basic Use Case
This rst use case is illustrated on gure 3.2.
Two VMs located in the network will communicate. As soon as they do, adequate routing
rules have to be set for the trac to go through the right middlebox instances. The selection
of the instances could be based on the identity of the VMs or the type of trac emitted.
More precisely, we consider two VMs, VM1 and VM2 , located on dierent physical
servers, respectively PS1 and PS2. Several middleboxes are located across the network. In
this particular example, we consider three middlebox instances : M1, M2 and M3.
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Figure 3.2 Basic use case
Scenario 1
VM1 is running an application which needs to communicate with VM2. As the rst packet
is emitted, the rst step of the process is to identify the ow by its characteristics.
Once the ow is identied, it is translated into a middlebox sequence to be traversed.
This security chain has to be taken in consideration as the path to take is determined. Let's
assume the middlebox chain is M1-M2-M3.
Furthermore, the routing rules have to be set, in order to allow the trac to go throughout
the proper devices. In our case, it means going from VM1 to M1's ingress switch, then through
M1 to M1's egress switch. The packets are then routed to M2's ingress switch and similarly
through M2 to M2's egress switch. The same is done to go through M3. Then, the packets
are routed from M3's egress switch to VM2.
Scenario 2
Let's assume that VM1 is running another application. This application could be using a
dierent protocol, or using dierent ports. The trac of this other application could be
identify as another ow.
Once this new ow is identied, it corresponds also to a security chain. This security
chain could be the same as previous or could be dierent. Let's assume that the security
chain is now dierent, for example, M2-M3.
The routing rules related to this new security chain also have to be put in place in the
same way as previous.
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Conclusion
In this very rst use case, we distinguished two scenarios which would likely occur. Based
on these scenarios, we can already identify several key issues that our solution will have to
address.
First of all, the dierent ows have to be identied and linked to a particular security
chain. As we have seen in the literature review, the distinction between dierent tenants
trac could be done by identifying the characteristics of the ow.
In this use case, we can see that it would be interesting to have an identication which
could separate distinct ows even within a tenant's network, and even on a sole machine,
in order to provide a particular security policy for each type of application which could be
running.
Furthermore, both these scenarios could happen at the same time. We can sense that
the routing rules which would have to be put in place would be relatively identical, as the
security chains are quite similar (M1-M2-M3 vs. M2-M3).
Because of the size of nowadays' data centers, the multiplication of identical rules could
be a hindrance to the scalability of our model. Therefore, it would be interesting to be able
to aggregate these rule.
3.1.2 Reconguration upon Migration
The second use case is a little more complex than the rst one. Two VMs are commu-
nicating in a similar way as previous. However, in a data center, the cloud provider will
ask for a VM to migrate to another physical server. The migration of VMs can be quite
useful, for example when a hardware have to be replaced, or in order to optimize the load of
the physical servers. In this use case, we analyze what should happen to allow the security
policies to remain consistent despite the node migration.
In this use case, we consider two VMs, VM1 and VM2. These two VMs are located on
dierent physical servers, respectively PS1 and PS2. As previous, several middleboxes are
located across the network. We consider four middleboxes, M1, M2, M3 and M4.
Another physical server is present in this example, PS3. In our scenarios, the VM1 will
migrate from PS1 to PS3.
This use case is illustrated on the 3.3.
Scenario 1 - Part 1
VM1 is running an application which needs to communicate with VM2. In the same fashion
as in the rst use case, the rst step will be the identication of the ow.
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Figure 3.3 Case of a migration
Once the ow is identied, it corresponds to a middlebox chain to be traversed. Let's
assume the middlebox chain is M1-M2-M3.
Finally, the routing rules have to be set at the switches level, in order to allow the trac
to go throughout the proper devices. The last step is the same as previous.
Scenario 1 - Part 2
Let's assume that VM1 is migrated from PS1 to PS3. The new occurrence of VM1 is noted
VM-mig on the 3.3.
The application running on VM1 is still running on VM-mig, and after the migration, the
rst packet emitted will be identied in the same way as previous.
Once the ow is identied, it is mapped to a middlebox chain. Previously, this trac
corresponded to M1-M2-M3. The most basic situation would be to continue to route the
packets throughout the middleboxes M1, M2, and M3. However, it may be possible that the
middlebox M1 and M4 are two instances of the same type of middlebox. For instance, M1
and M4 could be both a rewall. In this particular case, it would be interesting to consider
the chain M4-M2-M3 instead of M1-M2-M3.
Scenario 2 In this second scenario, we consider the migration of the destination node,
instead of the source node. Concretely, it means that VM2 is migrating from PS1 to PS2,
and would then be named VM-mig.
Upon a migration, the rules set which route the packets from VM1 to VM2 should be
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discarded in order to allow VM2 to keep on receiving the messages coming from VM1.
Once the rules have been discarded, the next packet sent by VM1 will be identied,
and the rules will be set according to the corresponding security chain, in the same way as
previous.
Conclusion
One particularity of the cloud network is the node migration. This use case presents how
the application of security policies could be impacted by the migration of the sender or the
receiver. From these scenarios, we identify two key issue in order to build an ecient solution.
First of all, we have seen that the ow must be identied in order to apply the right
security policy. Thereby, the rst question raised is how to eciently identify a node or an
application's trac, despite the location of the node in the network. As the identication of
the node is key to apply a policy, the identication must be consistent, regardless the node's
migration.
The second issue raised here is the consistency of existing rules after the migration of a
node. Indeed, two cases are present here. First, when the sender migrates, the new rules set
must be coherent with the security policies. Secondly, when the receiver is migrating, the
previous routing rules must be discarded, or modied in order to allow the trac to reach
the receiver. An optimal solution would take this into account.
3.1.3 Communication between Distinct Zones
In order to the solution to be scalable, the whole network to secure or to manage is often
partitioned in smaller sub-networks, each ruled by one controller. In such a scenario, it would
be possible for two communicating nodes to belong to dierent sub-networks, or zones.
This third and last use case is another variation of the rst use case. Two VMs are
communicating in a similar way as previous. However, in this case, they belong in two
dierent regions ; each region being ruled by a distinct network controller.
In this use case, we consider VM1 and VM2, located on dierent physical servers, respec-
tively PS1 and PS2. In this case, these two VMs, a fortiori these two physical servers, are
located in two dierent zones, identied as Zone 1 and Zone 2 on the 3.4. As previous, four
middleboxes are located across the network.
Scenario
VM1 is running an application which needs to communicate with VM2. As the rst packet
is emitted and identied as previous.
Once the ow is identied, the middlebox chain to be traversed is determined, as previous.
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Figure 3.4 Communication between two zones
One particularity of this case is to know where to send the packet to. Indeed, the Zone
1 may not be aware of the location of VM2.
Once the Zone 1 has resolved to which gateway switch the packet needs to be sent to,
it has to decide throughout which middleboxes the packet must be sent through. This is
problematic as the route from VM1 to VM2 go through several distinct zones.
Let's assume that M1 and M3 are middleboxes of the same type, for instance, rewalls.
Furthermore, let's assume M2 and M4 are also of the same type, for instance, Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI). Finally, let's assume that the security chain corresponds to the traversal
of a rewall and a DPI.
We can see that in this scenario, there are several possibilities. First, the security chain
could be completely realized in Zone 1, by passing through M1 then M2, before being routed
towards Zone 2. Then, another possibility is to apply the middlebox traversal completely in
Zone 2, by traversing M3 and M4. Finally, it would also be possible to traverse one middlebox
in each zone by going through M1 in Zone 1 and M4 in Zone 2.
Conclusion
Due to the large size of Cloud networks, the partitioning of a big network in smaller entities
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has often been done. In this use case, we were interested in how the enforcement of security
policies could be done in a context where the sender and the receiver are located in distinct
zones. From this use case, we highlighted several issues which need to be addressed.
The rst issue highlighted is the one regarding the routing of packets from one zone to
another. Indeed, when the destination is not reachable directly, there must be a mechanism
in order to determine the gateway to send the packet to.
Moreover, once the ow is identied and the destination is known, the routing rules must
be set according to the middlebox instances to traverse. Indeed, as we have seen in the last
example, the policy enforcement can be made totally in a zone or be mixed between the two
zones.
Finally, there is another issue regarding the destination Zone. Indeed, when a packet
arrives, it is of identied, and the corresponding middlebox chain is retrieved. In this context,
how can the second zone determine which portion of the middlebox chain has already been
enforced in the rst zone?
3.1.4 Conclusion on the Use Cases
In this section, we analyzed three dierent use cases in order to visualize the type of
situations which could occur in a cloud network where a policy enforcement mechanism
is in place. From these situations, we highlighted several issue in order to have a better
understanding of what our solution is designed for.
First of all, the ow identication will be a key aspect of the mechanism, as it has to be
done in a consistent manner, despite the node migration.
Second of all, the node migration leads to the search of an enforcement mechanism which
respects the consistency of the security policies.
The scalability of the solution is a crucial requirement in the cloud. We will analyze how
we should aggregate the ows in order to reduce the number of routing rules inside the data
center.
Finally, as the data center may be partitioned, the enforcement mechanism must support
the application of security policies distributed on dierent zones ruled by dierent controllers.
3.2 Security Requirements
In this section, we will the dene the security requirements of our model. Those are
the properties we want our architecture to possess in order to secure the multi-tenant cloud
network.
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As we described in the introduction, our problem only takes in consideration the attack
of a tenant by another tenant, or by malicious nodes within its network.
3.2.1 Isolation
Trac isolation is the rst requirement which was identied from the beginning, and
which is key in order to build a secure network, as it prevent a tenant to be threatened by
another tenant. Furthermore, We will consider only the trac isolation at the network level.
The isolation at the hypevisor level as well as any other type of isolation will be considered
to be out of scope in our project.
3.2.2 Applying Security Policies
In this context, security policy means a chain of middleboxes which need to be traversed.
For a security chain, a particular middlebox type can be present only once in the chain.
For example, if a security chain is composed of three elements, and the rst one is of the
rewall type, then neither the second nor the third could be a rewall.
Furthermore, our solution must enforce the totality of the security policy, not less, not
more. Indeed, when a security policy is set, we will not allow for the trac to traverse more
or less middleboxes than required. The sequence in which the middleboxes are traversed is
also very important and must not be modied. When the entire security policy can not be
applied, the packet will be drop by default.
At the network level, our solution aims solely to enforce the route between the source and
the destination, throughout the middlebox instances selected.
Regarding the middlebox instance selection mechanism, we decide not to set any con-
straints. We leave it out of scope albeit we believe it could be further investigated in future
researches.
3.2.3 Tolerance to Node Migration
Thid problem is particular to the cloud environment. As the nodes migrate inside the
data center, the security policies have to remain consistent. This is an important stake, as
we would not want for the security policies to become obsolete at each migration of a node.
As we highlighted in the section 3.1, the migration could concern either the sender of the
receiver of a communication. In our work, we will only consider the sender's migration, and
focus on the reconguration of the network.
Indeed, as the receiver would migrate, we would need be to discard the rules. In order to
discard the rules, we must rst detect the migration. For instance, this migration could be
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detected either by a signal send by the cloud operating system or by a modication on the
network's topology. We believe it is better to leave this concern out of scope.
3.2.4 Scalability
The use of computers and networks has become dominant in our modern society. The
cloud is, more than others, very sensible to the scalability of the solutions in place, due to
the immense size of the data centers.
As we have seen in the 3.1, several similar routing rules could be set at the forwarding
elements level. One of our goal will be to nd a way to aggregate those rules. For instance,
when several ows will be routed from a middlebox to another, we will try to use a unique
rule which would match all dierent cases, insofar as possible.
As the data center would reach a critical size, it is likely that its network will be partitioned
in smaller networks, in order to achieve reasonable performance. Therefore, the sender and
the receiver of a communication could be located in two dierent zones, ruled by two dierent
controllers.
The solution must allow for the middleboxes to be traversed in the same zone or in dierent
zones, in order to provide exibility to the cloud provider. Whether the enforcement of the
policy is local or distributed, the policy must be applied in a consistent manner.
Finally, we don't specify the size of the possible zones inside the data center. First of
all, because it is very dicult to obtain information on the size of existing data center, thus
to build a coherent solution regarding the reality of its use. Furthermore, the core of our
research resides in the enforcement of security policies, therefore we believe the search of
scalability solutions is out of scope. Last but nor least, our solution will focus only on the
feasibility and its performance will not be optimized.
3.3 Technical Alternatives
In life in general and in computer science in particular, there are several ways to achieve a
goal. In this section, we review the dierent technical solutions available in order to enforce
security policies by routing the trac through security appliances.
For each requirement, we will determine the pros and cons of each solution. Then, we
will explain our choices regarding the solutions which we will use in our project.
Isolation
We have identied the isolation of tracs as the rst requirement of our model. First
of all, we have seen the topological segmentation, where elements are physically separated
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from one another. This technique provides a guaranteed isolation but impairs greatly the
scalability of the solution as well as its cost. The use of VLAN is common in the networking
eld, as its use is predominant in enterprises and the research eld. The principle is to create
smaller broadcast domains inside a big network, in order to isolate their members from one
another. Although this technology is useful in several elds, its lack of scalability and its
manual conguration makes is little adapted for the cloud. The last technology evoked was
the isolation and processing of the trac by analyzing the characteristics of the ows. These
techniques provide the isolation capabilities required and the management can be automated
and centralized. The automation of the setting of the routing rules could also appear as a
drawback, as the isolation is depending on the good programming of the controller, which
could represent a single point of failure.
In order to build our solution, we believe the more suitable technology would be the last
one exposed. Indeed, matching the ows directly would allow us to have a centralized control
on the architecture, which is key to our problem.
Therefore, our architecture will be built as a SDN, and more precisely with the OF tech-
nology [11]. It will allow us to build a controller which will allow the automatic enforcement
of rules. The OF technology is based on the separation of the control plane and the data
plane. The centralized controller set rules in the forwarding elements, and the routing is done
based on these rules. There is no superior logic inside the forwarding elements. This allows
the conguration to be done in a centralized way. Furthermore, any packet belonging to an
unknown ow will be sent to the controller, which will then set the rules inside the switches.
Security Chain
Our solution aims to secure the trac of the tenants by making it traverse sequences of
middleboxes, based on the tenant's requirements. In order to do so, we will need to route the
packets from a source to a destination, and throughout the adequate number of middleboxes.
Previously, we surveyed what have been done in the recent works in order to do so. In this
section, we investigate the dierent ways to set the routing rules into the forwarding elements.
As the rst packet of a ow is emitted by a VM, it reaches a forwarding element of the
architecture. As it is belonging to an unknown ow, it is forwarded to the controller for
processing. As we are in the context of a software-dened network, we have the possibility
to set routing rules inside the forwarding element which originally sent the packet to the
controller, but not only. Indeed, the controller can set rules in any switch it is connected to.
Thereby, we have two technical alternatives here, as we can set the rules either step-by-
step, or hierarchically.
Enforcing the rules in a step-by-step manner would be likely to reduce the complexity of
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the controller's logical. However, for the rst packet of the ow, at each step of the route,
the packet will be sent to the controller where it is going to be processed. In a hierarchical
manner, several rules will be pushed down to multiple switches at the same time, and this,
upon the rst call to the controller.
Incidentally, the processing time of one packet could be higher in a hierarchical rule
installation. However, the multiplication of requests of the step by step manner will likely
be less ecient. Moreover, the communication between the controller and the forwarding
elements will be more important in a step-by-step installation versus a hierarchical rule
installation.
The way we enforce the rules is as important as the way we match the ows. Indeed, in
order to set the rules, we need to determine what ows we need to process. The Openow
technology allows to match the ows based on many characteristics. It allows the switches
to modify information on a packet, such as their addresses and tags.
Matching the ows could be done in two ways. On one hand, we could use the charac-
teristics of the ow, such as the destination and/or source addresses. On the other hand,
meta-data could be added to the packets, by using the OF capability of adding and removing
tags.
The routing based on the characteristics is what is achieved in [19]. In this solution, they
use the MAC address of the sender and receiver, in order to match the adequate security pol-
icy. The packet is then consecutively encapsulated with the MAC address of each middlebox
along the path. At the end of the path, the packet is routed to its original destination.
Adding meta-data to the packet consists in adding a piece of information, using a tag, for
example, in order to identify the security policy which applies to the ow. The advantage
of this solution lies in the controller. Indeed, having many source/destination combinations
matching the same middlebox sequence would require a lot of memory in the controller.
Furthermore, retrieving this data would increase processing time.
In order to build our solution, we rst choose to use the hierarchical rule installation, as
we believe it is a simpler approach and will reduce the communications between the server
and the forwarding elements. Furthermore, we believe it will reduce the overall processing
time of the controller as well. Moreover, the routing will be done based on the meta-data.
Indeed, we believe that it is more ecient to preset several middlebox sequences and to bind
a specic identier to each. Henceforth, we will call this identier Application ID (AppID).
We assume that the running hypervisor has the capability of inserting this AppID to the
packet, based on the application running on the VM.
As the VM emits a packet, the rst encountered switch will recognize this packet as a
new ow, forward it to the controller. The latter will then extract the AppID in order to
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retrieve the corresponding security policy in the form of a middlebox sequence. Immediately,
the controller will push the routing rules down the forwarding elements along the path from
the source to the destination, and throughout the middlebox instances.
The routing will then be made by adding meta-data to the packet in order to route
it to the next middlebox instance. This data, most probably in the form of a tag, will
represent the middlebox instance to be routed to. At the switch level, the matching of a ow
will be done based on this tag. It is thus necessary to keep a table binding the middleboxes
instances to their meta-data tag. We decide to call the meta-data tag the Elastic Enforcement
Layer (EEL)-tag.
Migration Tolerance
Once a security chain is in place, it needs to stay coherent. This is a challenge in a
context where the nodes can migrate from one physical server to another. This is why the
requirement we tackle in this section is the migration tolerance.
Thereby, we want to build our solution having in mind that anytime and anywhere in the
network, one node could disappear, and suddenly, reappear in another part of the network. It
means that the rules which have been set prior to the migration of a node should not match
other packets from other nodes, whether they were already running or suddenly appearing.
It also means that once the VM has migrated successfully, its newly sent packets must be
routed through the same middleboxes as it was prior to the.
Regarding the previous point, the rst approach would be to discard the rules which
match the information of the migrating node, as its MAC or IP address, for instance. The
rules, instead of being discarded, could also be modied. Another method would be to
use the default timeout of the matching rules inside the ow tables of the OF-switch and
most importantly, to use a way of conguration/reconguration allowing the new ows to be
routed eciently. It would be only a matter of time for the obsolete rules to be discarded
automatically.
The instant deletion of obsolete rules is quite interesting as it allows to be sure that all
the rules in the data center are coherent and up to date. However, it requires rstly to be
able to detect the migration. This requires for the cloud operating system and the controller
to be able to communicate somehow. Otherwise, the detection could be made by analyzing
the network topology changes. It would mean that for a node which just start emitting
packets, the controller may consider this as a change of topology (as the node appears in the
network) and unicast each forwarding elements of the network in order to discard potential
rules matching this newly emitting node. This is not a good solution as it would ood the
network and thus decrease the scalability of the architecture. In order to avoid this, we could
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keep a mapping between the nodes and the switches in which rules corresponding to the
nodes are set. However, this model is not satisfying either, as maintaining such a table would
be wasted memory and also would be a hurdle to an optimal scalability. Finally, another
drawback of this solution is the fact that a receiver node would not necessarily emits packets,
and thus would not be detected as a migrated node.
We believe the best solution is to nd a way to congure the route in such manner that
packets will be routed accordingly to the security policies, and this, whether it's a VM newly
created of freshly migrated. Upon migration, the obsolete rules will be discarded as they
reach the set timeout. As the migration of a receiver node would imply a communication
with the cloud operating system, we decide to focus solely on the migration of a sender.
Scalability
Scalability is a key stake in our project, as it is a crucial issue for all cloud architectures.
We do not set numbered requirements, neither regarding the optimal size of our network,
nor the maximum number of rules we want to have in our switches. We only set a rst stone
in order to build an architecture allowing the dynamic enforcement of security policies in a
multi-tenant cloud network. However, in order to design a solution which could be enhanced
in the future, we need to take the scalability of our solution into consideration. More precisely,
we consider a cloud network which can be partitioned in zones, each of them being ruled by
a distinct controller. Furthermore, we want to set rules which match more than one source-
destination combination, in order to put less burden on the forwarding elements and thereby
reduce their processing time.
As we have exposed in the section 3.1.3, it is possible that in such a context, we need to
apply a security policy between two nodes belonging in dierent zones of the data center.
Thus, we want the rules to be set in a way which allow to apply one part of the policy
in one zone and the rest of it in another zone. The matching of the ows is going to be
based on meta-data added to the packet by the forwarding elements, the EEL-tag. The
presence of an EEL-tag on the packet while it reaches the second zone could be used as an
information meaning that the security policy has already been partially applied. A security
policy, as we previously said, is a chain of middlebox type to be traversed. After careful
reexion, we believe the EEL-tag can be divided in two sub-categories. The rst category
will represent the middlebox type. A particular tag would mean \rewall", \DPI", \Intrusion
Detection System (IDS)", etc... A security policy will then be declared as a chain of EEL-tag
representing a middlebox type. We will call these tags : generic EEL-tag (gTag). The other
category of EEL-tag would represent the middlebox instance, and be used as the routing rules
are pushed down the forwarding elements. We will call these tags : instance EEL-tag (iTag).
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As the packet must be routed from one zone to another, and in the case where just a part
of the security chain has been applied, the gTag of the next middlebox type to be traversed
will be set to the packet. As the packet arrives in the second zone, the controller will gather
the gTag information in combination with the AppID, which will give the security chain as
well as the part of it which has previously been applied.
The use of these EEL-tags will allow us to further obtain more scalability. Indeed, con-
sidering the source VM1, to destination VM2 and going throughout M1, M2 and M3. Once
the tags have been set, the routing is made based on the iTags corresponding to M1, M2
and M3. These iTags will match the packets from VM1 to VM2, but also any other source-
destination combination which would be routed to M1 and/or M2 and/or M3. This allow a
ow aggregation, unlike, for example, a routing based on the source and destination IP or
MAC addresses.
The use of these tags will allow the partition of the network in smaller zones, each ruled
by a separate controller. The routing is done from a machine to another, throughout the
corresponding middleboxes, independently to the location of the machines and the middle-
boxes. Furthermore, the use of these tags allow us to reduce the number of entries in the
ow tables of the switches, as all packets going to a particular middlebox would be treated
the same way.
Conclusion
In this section, we built on the rened requirements, in order to achieve the transition
from the denition of the project's requirements to the technical solutions we are opting for.
We have exposed the reasoning underlying the choices we have made regarding all the
requirements.
3.4 Selected the technologies to build our algorithm
Our goal is to automatically enforce security policies in a multi-tenant cloud network.
The environment is volatile as the nodes can migrate unpredictably. The environment is
elastic as the network can scale up and down to answer the customers' needs.
3.4.1 Selected Technologies
In this section, we summarize the selected technologies and models that we will use in
order to build our solution.
We build a solution based on the OF technology. A centralized controller will operate on
a set of switches which will send to the controller any new packet belonging to a new ow.
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As the controller receives this packet, it retrieves the AppID inserted in the packet by the
hypervisor. This AppID corresponds to a security policy, in the form of a chain of middlebox
type. This chain of middleboxes is represented by a chain of gTags, also called gTags. These
gTags are then translated in iTags, each iTag corresponding to an actual running middlebox
instance of the network. The controller then identies the path from the source to the
destination and throughout the selected middlebox instances. The routing rules are pushed
down in all the forwarding elements along the path. The iTags are pushed by the switches
to the packet, in order for them to be routed to the adequate middleboxes. The use of those
tags allow us to aggregate many ows with one rule.
In the case where the destination and source VMs are in dierent zones, ruled by dierent
controllers, it can happen that part of the chain is applied in the rst data-center. Then, the
gTag corresponding to the next middlebox type to be applied is added to the packet, and
the latter is routed out of the zone. As the packet reaches the second zone, the packet is sent
to the controller. The latter analyzes the information present in the packet and nds the
AppID as well as the gTag. The controller can then deduce the rest of the security chain and
set the routing rules down the data path. In order to avoid ambiguous resolving of security
policies left to be traversed, we need :
8(gTagi; gTagj) in the same chain of middlebox, gTagi 6= gTagj.
3.4.2 Algorithm Flowchart
We now have a clear idea of what we want our solution to do. However, in order to have a
better view of it, we want to build the owchart of the algorithm. This owchart will help us
visualize our solution in order to eciently build a proof of concept of our network controller.
The owchart presented on 3.5 summarize the logic of our solution. Below is the detailed
explanation of the algorithm
The initial situation is a VM running on any physical server. This VM runs an application
which corresponds to an AppID. As the VM starts emitting packets corresponding to this
application, the hypervisor intercepts the packets and set an AppID to the packets. We
choose not to precise how this is achieved as we consider the intervention of the hypervisor
being out of scope. The packet then reaches a rst switch, where it is recognize as belonging
to none of the existing ows, because it does not match any ow entry inside the OF switch.
The controller, having the capability of analyzing the packet and deciding what ow entries
to push down the data path, receives this unknown packet. It then extracts the AppID tag
contained in the packet. The controller holds a table matching AppIDs to security chains in
form of gTag chains. The AppID retrieved from the packet will then reveal the security policy
to be applied for this particular ow. We have seen previously that in the case where the
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Figure 3.5 EEL algorithm owchart
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destination and source VMs are located in dierent data centers, we have the possibility to
delegate the application of all or part of the security policy to the controller of the destination
zone. This particular situation will be referred to as a \wildcard". This wildcard possibility
is obviously impacting the application of the security chain, it is why the next step in our
algorithm is to check whether the destination VM is located in the zone ruled by the very
same controller which received the packet belonging to an unknown ow. The location of the
destination machine will impact the conversion of the gTag chain to a iTag chain. Indeed,
when the destination is remote, it is possible to use a wildcard. when a wildcard is used, the
gTag of the rst middlebox remaining to traversed will be used in order to tag the packet
before routing it out of the zone. Once that all the parameters have been determined, the
controller pushes the rules down all the switches along the path. Once this step has been
completed, the security policy is enforced. Finally, upon migration, the same process is
repeated which allows the security policy to be applied even though the security instances
to be traversed may dier from the ones which were traversed prior to the migration.
3.4.3 Revisited Use Cases
In this section, we revisit the use cases previously exposed by applying the logic described
in the owchart.
A use case of security rule enforcement
To illustrate how our model works, we describe in this section a simple use case to illustrate
how we can enforce the traversal of a sequence of middle boxes between a pair of VMs. The
example is demonstrated in Figure 3.6. Let's assume that the tenant has dened that the
trac emitted by the VM1 correspond to the AppID-9, which means that the trac must
go through an IDS, an Application Firewall (AppFW) and a DPI. Let's assume that VM1
is trying to communicate with VM2, which is in a region controlled by the same controller.
Note that in our examples, the ingress and egress switch of middleboxes are the same.
1. VM1 starts emitting packets. These packets are intercepted by the hypervisor that
inserts the AppID into the IP options eld.
2. The OpenFlow-Switch (OFS) forwards the rst packet to the controller.
3. The OpenFlow-Controller (OFC) extracts the AppID and determine the chain of gTags
to be traversed
4. It then matches the Generic Tags (gTags) to an Instance Tags (iTags) range
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5. It then chooses the middlebox instances to send the packet to (based on cloud resource
availability). In our example, let's assume the chosen instances of IDS, AppFW and
DPI correspond to iTags 2070, 1045 and 3093 respectively.
6. The OFC adds a two new ow-entries into the VM1's edge OFS :
{ Packets from VM1 (to VM2) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets with EEL-tag 2070 must be routed to the next switch towards the IDS 2070
instance.
7. The OFC also adds three new ow-entries into the IDS's ingress and egress OFS :
{ Packets tagged with EEL-tag 2070 must have their tag popped and be forwarded to
the IDS (ingress).
{ Packets out of the IDS, from VM1 and to VM2 must have the EEL-tag 1045 pushed
(egress).
{ Packets with EEL-tag 1045 must be routed to the next switch towards the AppFW
1045 instance (egress).
8. Similar rules to the previous ones are to be set into all the middleboxes edge's OFS.
Note that for the egress switch of the last middlebox in the chain, the packet should
only be routed to the next switch towards the destination VM.
9. Along the path, the controller adds a rule to forward the packet to the next switch
towards the middlebox instance, based on the EEL-tag.
Figure 3.6 Simple use case of policy enforcement
In this simple use case, we have illustrated how a simple chain of middleboxes is set for
a particular ow.
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A Use Case of Aggregation
Next, we demonstrate the scalable design of our proposal under aggregation. This example
is a variation of the previous one. We have now three source VMs communicating with the
same destination VM. It is shown in Figure 3.7. Let's assume that the tenant has dened
that the trac emitted by the VM1 and VM2 correspond to the AppID-9, which means that
the trac must go through an IDS, an AppFW and a DPI and trac emitted by the VM3
correspond to the AppID-10, which means that the trac must only go through an AppFW
and a DPI. Let's assume that these VMs are trying to communicate with VM4, which is in
a region controlled by the same controller.
1. The VMs start emitting packets. These packets are intercepted by the hypervisor that
inserts the AppID into the IP options eld.
2. Same as previous.
3. Same as previous.
4. Same as previous.
5. Same as previous.
6. The OFC adds new ow-entries into the VM1's edge OFS :
{ Packets from VM1 (to VM4) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets from VM2 (to VM4) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets from VM3 (to VM4) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets with EEL-tag 2070 must be routed to the next switch towards the IDS 2070
instance.
7. The OFC then adds new ow-entries into the IDS's ingress and egress OFS :
{ Packets tagged with EEL-tag 2070 must have their tag popped and be forwarded to
the IDS (ingress).
{ Packets out of the IDS, from VM1 and to VM4 must have the EEL-tag 1045 pushed
(egress).
{ Packets out of the IDS, from VM2 and to VM4 must have the EEL-tag 1045 pushed
(egress).
{ Packets with EEL-tag 1045 must be routed to the next switch towards the AppFW
1045 instance (egress).
8. Similar rules to the previous ones are to be set into all the middleboxes edge's switch.
Note that for the egress switch of the last middlebox in the chain, the packet should
only be routed to the next switch towards the destination VM.
9. Along the path, the controller adds a rule to forward the packet to the next switch
towards the middlebox instance, based on the EEL-tag.
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Figure 3.7 Simple use case of ow aggregation
In this second simple use case, we illustrated how several ows can be aggregated. Partic-
ularly, the rules at a middleboxes ingress switch allow to match all the ows directed to this
particular middlebox, in a simple manner. In the ingress switches, only one rule has to be
set, matching the EEL-tag. Furthermore, we can see that the routing based on the EEL-tags
allows to aggregate several ows on the switches along the path. In our example, only two
rules are pushed into OFS-1 (Openow Switch-1) and only one rule at OFS-2, for a number
of three dierent ows.
A Use Case of Wildcard Tags
Our design also makes use of the wildcard in rule matching to improve the scalability.
The detailed steps are shown in Figure 3.8. It is similar to previous example. However, in
this case, the source and destination VMs are in zones ruled by dierent controller.
The chain of middleboxes remains IDS, AppFW a DPI.
The gTag corresponding to an AppFW is 18.
1. VM1 starts emitting packets. These packets are intercepted by the hypervisor that
inserts the AppID into the IP options eld.
2. The switch forwards the rst packet to the controller.
3. The OFC extracts the AppID and determine the chain of gTags to be traversed
4. It then matches the gTags to an iTags range
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5. The controller chooses IDS instance 2070, but based on the availability of AppFW-1,
the controller-1 decides to use a wildcard tag for the AppFW, and forwards the packet
towards its nal destination.
6. The controller adds a two new ow-entries into the VM1's edge switch :
{ Packets from VM1 (to VM2) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets with EEL-tag 2070 must be routed to the next switch towards the IDS 2070
instance.
7. The controller also adds three new ow-entries into the IDS's ingress and egress switch
:
{ Packets tagged with EEL-tag 2070 must have their tag popped and be forwarded to
the IDS (ingress).
{ Packets out of the IDS, from VM1 and to VM2 must have the EEL-tag 18 pushed
(egress).
{ Packets with EEL-tag 18 must be routed to the next switch towards VM2 (egress).
8. Along the path, the controller adds a rule to forward the packet to the next switch
towards the middlebox instance, based on the EEL-tag.
9. Once the packet reaches the rst switch of the second region, the packet is sent to the
controller-2.
10. It resolves the AppID in order to know what types of middlebox are to be traversed.
11. It then resolves the gTags in order to know what types of middlebox are still to be
traversed.
12. The controller chooses the middlebox instances to be traversed.
13. Rules are set same as previous.
In this third simple use case, we illustrated the use of wildcards. We can see that a
controller has the ability to delegate the responsibility of applying the security measure to
another region. This can be very useful in the cloud, as it allows a better use of resources.
A Use Case of Migration
Our design also provides the resilience of security measures upon VM-migration. The
detailed steps are shown in Figure 3.9. It is similar to rst example. However, the chain of
middleboxes is now IDS and AppFW.
The iTag corresponding to the IDS-1 is 2070. The iTag corresponding to the AppFW is 1045.
The iTag corresponding to the IDS-2 is 2080.
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Figure 3.8 Use case of wildcards
1. VM1 starts emitting packets. These packets are intercepted by the hypervisor that
inserts the AppID into the IP options eld.
2. The switch forwards the rst packet to the controller.
3. The OFC adds a two new ow-entries into the VM1's edge OFS :
{ Packets from VM1 (to VM2) must be tagged with EEL-tag 2070.
{ Packets with EEL-tag 2070 must be routed to the next switch towards the IDS 2070
instance.
4. The controller also adds three new ow-entries into the IDS's ingress and egress switch
:
{ Packets tagged with EEL-tag 2070 must have their tag popped and be forwarded to
the IDS (ingress).
{ Packets out of the IDS, from VM1 and to VM2 must have the EEL-tag 1045 pushed
(egress).
{ Packets with EEL-tag 1045 must be routed to the next switch towards the AppFW
1045 instance (egress).
A similar rule is set on the AppFW's ingress and egress switch
5. Along the path, the controller adds a rule to forward the packet to the next switch
towards the middlebox instance, based on the EEL-tag.
6. The VM1 migrates from the physical server PS1 to the physical server PS3 and becomes
VM1'.
7. VM1' starts emitting packets. These packets are intercepted by the hypervisor that
inserts the AppID into the IP options eld.
8. Same as previous.
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9. Same as previous. Note that the IDS iTag is now 2080. Only the AppFW egress
switch rules may be modied, for example if VM1 and VM1' don't have the same MAC
address.
10. Same as previous.
Figure 3.9 Resilience upon VM-migration
In this last simple use case, we illustrated how the security measures persist through
migration. New rules are enforced when the VM1' starts emitting packets, in the same way
as previous. The former rules matching the VM1 as the destination will timeout in order to
reduce the load on the switches. Even though the security appliances traversed are not the
same as they were prior to the migration, we can see that the security chain is respected.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
There is a time to read and a time to write, there is a time to think and a time to act. We
rst described our project and reviewed the literature on the relevant work that had been done
during the past few years on the matter. We then rened our requirements and proposed
a new model to control the network. This model is designed in order to enforce security
policies in the form of middlebox sequences. The enforcement of these policies is constrained
by the characteristics of the cloud and particularly the migration of nodes. It is now time to
develop an implementation of our algorithm, because the theory is not enough. In order to
create a prototype, we need to make further choices. The current chapter will describe our
implementation. We will explain what we want to achieve by building this implementation
as well as the proof we want to nd. We will then explain what the environment we are
working in. We will close this section by describing the created components and the choice
we have made in order to go from theory to practice.
4.1 Implementation
When we transpose a model or an algorithm into a concrete solution, it is always a
challenge. Indeed, on one hand we want to stay close to the algorithm but on the other
hand, we must make decisions regarding the implementation but also regarding the developing
tools to use. After designing the architecture allowing a cloud provider to secure its tenants
networks, it is now time to implement and test it. In order to do so, we rst dene what
information we want to gather from the tests. We will then focus on the environment in
which we will build our solution. Finally, we will describe the created components of our
prototype.
4.1.1 Goal of the Implementation
The work that we try to achieve is something that has not been done in the past. One
work is similar to what we try to do, as it applies the traversal to a sequence of middleboxes to
certain tracs. What we want to achieve is however dierent, as we focus on the consistency
of the rules upon node migration. Some other work has been done in order to secure the
cloud, but the focus was more on the ease of management or the performance of the network
controller. As this is the rst implementation of our design, we will focus more on feasibility
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and functionality, rather than optimized performance. We can further argue that our design
is dependent on routing protocol in order to work, as our work focuses only on the mechanism
allowing the migration tolerance. The routing protocol that we will use will not be optimized.
Furthermore, the rule optimization is another point which will not be addressed in our
research. We will thus build an implementation and test it in order to provide the proof that
our mechanism can achieve what we built it for. We want to build simple cases as we believe
they will be present our model in a simpler and more general way.
Secure the Trac by Enforcing the Traversal of Middlebox Sequences
The proof of concept will rst have to demonstrate our rst requirement. We will show
that our implementation is able to enforce the traversal of a middlebox sequence. It means
that based on the Application ID inserted in the packet by the hypervisor, the network
controller will retrieve the security chain corresponding to this particular ow. The ow must
then be routed throughout the middleboxes, respectively to the order of the security policy.
Moreover, the packet must not be encapsulated or modied as it reaches the middlebox,
in order for the packet analysis to be done correctly. Once that the whole security policy
has been applied, the packet must be routed towards its original destination. As the packet
reaches the rst switch and is sent to the controller, the latter must set the rules along the
whole path. It means that for one ow, the communication between a switch and a controller
must be done only once, when the rst packet reaches the rst switch.
Resisting Node Migration
The second point that we need to demonstrate that our solution can operate in the cloud,
despite the node migration. In order to do so, we will need to migrate the nodes during
our tests. We want the node migration to require the conguration of a new route. The
only requirement is that the new route has to respect the security chain. Indeed, as the
freshly migrated machine emits a packet, the same process will occur at the hypervisor level
in order to apply the AppID tag. Then, the route will be congured throughout the proper
middleboxes as previous. Regarding the security instances, the whole route, or just a part of
it, could be dierent from the previous route. We plan on providing such a proof in our test.
Scalability Mechanisms
We do not tackle the scalability issue of our model. Nonetheless, our model takes in
consideration the partition of the data center in smaller zones. Each zone being ruled by
a specic controller. There is a possibility that two VMs which are communicating are
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physically located in dierent zones. We have studied that case in the section 3.1.3 and
we have designed a solution allowing the traversal of the middlebox chain to be delegated to
another zone. We want to provide the proof that when such a situation occurs, the delegation
of the entire policy of part of it can be done from one zone to another.
4.1.2 Tools
This section is describing the design and implementation of our prototype. In order to
do so, we rst need to set up the environment in which we are going to work. We also need
to select the tools that we are going to use.
The deployment of the solution as well as the tests will be realized in a virtual environ-
ment, in order to have a greater liberty as we would have had on a physical host. It allows us
to develop the project on several physical machines concurrently, as we only need to adjust
the modications on the VM.
The two leading virtualization software are VirtualBox, developed by Oracle, and VMWare
Workstation, developed by VMWare. We chose the rst one because it is a solution which
is under and open license whilst providing the same capabilities of its concurrent, regarding
our requirements.
The Virtual Machine that we will use for development is under the Ubuntu operating
system. It has 512Mo of ash memory and a 6Gio hard drive.
Our solution is based on Software-Dened Networking. As it comes to the selection of
which SDN protocol to use, the choice is not too hard to make. Indeed, the OF protocol is
the leader in this eld, as it is the most advanced and complete protocol. It is standardized
by the Open Network Foundation and is already implemented by many vendors like Cisco,
IBM, Juniper, HP and NEC.
Now that we know what protocol will allow us to control and rule the network, we
need to choose which controller we are going to use in order to do so. There are several
existing controllers in order to control OF switches. Their dierences are mostly based on
the programming language they oer.
The rst controller choice is NOX. NOX is a controller platform on top of which we can
write a controller in Python, C++, or some combination of the two. NOX was the rst OF
controller and was developed by Nicira Networks. It was then been donated to the research
community in 2008 and has been the basis for many and various research projects.
Beacon is a Java-based OF controller platform. The development of a controller is en-
couraged to be done using the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment, and best run
in a host environment rather than a VM.
Floodlight is another Java-based OF controller platform. It is Apache-licensed and claims
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to be an enterprise-class OpenFlow controller.
Lastly, the Trema OpenFlow controller is a framework for developing controllers in Ruby
and C. Trema is the youngest of the controllers but provides a testing environment in the
form of a network emulator.
In order to develop our solution, we chose the NOX controller platform. We made this
choice because it was the best documented platform on which the community was very active.
We chose this controller because it seemed to be the one who tted the best our needs at the
time, but the project could have been implemented on any other platform.
By the time our project ended, the NOX controller platform has been divided in two
distinct projects. NOX, on top of which the controller can be written in C++ and POX, on
top of which the controller can be written in Python. The previous NOX version is referred
to as NOX-classic.
4.1.3 Created Components
Our project consists in the creation of a intelligent network which allows the enforcement
of security policies. Thanks to the recent development in Software-Dened Networks, the
implementation of such a project can be done in a much more easy way than it used to be.
Indeed, the mechanism that we developed in order to provide the consistency of the
security policies in spite of the migration of the nodes can be implemented as a network
controller.
In this section, we explained the choices we made as we coded the solution. The owchart
of our algorithm can be found on the 3.5. The rst steps are not the responsibility of the
controller.
As the packets arrives to the controller, the latter needs to retrieve the middlebox se-
quence. In order to do so, we need to get the AppID from the packet and to match it against
the databases containing this information.
Thereafter, we need to evaluate whether or not the source and destination VMs are in
the same zones. If it is not the case, measures will have to be taken in order to modify the
security chain accordingly.
As we know the source of the packet, its destination and the middleboxes throughout
which it must be routed, we need to calculate the adequate route.
Finally, we need to build the rules in order to treat the packets adequately all along the
path and to enforce the routing rules. After doing all these steps, the enforcement of the
security policy will be complete.
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Retrieving the Security Chain
As an unknown packet is detected at the switch level, it is sent to the controller. The rst
thing that the controller must do is to extract the AppID in order to retrieve the security
chain.
We assume that the hypervisor has the capability to insert the AppID in the packet, but
we don't specify a precise location for this identier. However, in order to implement our
solution, we have to choose a location. We decide to consider this Application ID inserted in
the IP options eld of the IP header, as shown in the 4.1.
Figure 4.1 IP header
At the controller level, we need to dig in the packet in order to retrieve this ID. The
python library does not oer a library able to get or set this eld. In order to achieve it, we
use the libraries array, struct and socket. We parse the packet in order to access the dierent
elds of the Ethernet and IP headers, in order to fetch the value of the IP options eld.
When we have the AppId, we need to translate it into a security chain. As we explained,
we use gTags in order to designate a middlebox type. Thereby, a security chain is represented
by a list of gTag. This is the rst database kept in the controller, a dictionary where each
AppID (the key) corresponds to a security chain in the form of a gTag list.
The ith line of the table is as follow :
AppIDi ! (gTagi;1; :::; gTagi;j; :::gTagi;n)
From the security chain to the particular instances to be traversed, the road is not over
yet. We know that an iTag represent an instance of middlebox. In order to know what type
of middlebox this iTag corresponds, we decided that to each gTag will correspond an iTag
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range. For instance, considering a particular gTag designating a rewall, all iTags included
in the range corresponding to a gTag will be rewall instances.
The second database kept in the controller is thus a dictionary mapping gTags (the key)
to an iTag range.
The ith line of the table is as follow :
gTagi ! (iTagm; iTagp)
The road is almost complete towards the resolve of the middlebox instance. We have
the range of possible iTags corresponding to the particular middlebox we want to traverse,
but it needs to be linked to an actual running Virtual Machine somewhere in the topology.
Therefore, our third database will be a dictionary mapping the iTags (the key) of the running
middleboxes to the IP address of the running machine.
The ith line of the table is as follow :
iTagi ! ipaddressi
In this section, we explained how we parse the incoming packet in order to fetch the
AppID and how we further translate it from an AppID to a chain of actual instances to be
traversed.
Wildcard Possibilities
As we keep progressing in the owchart presented in page 3.5, we now go one case further.
We now need to determine whether or not the source and destination machine belong to the
zone ruled by the controller.
In order to do so, we must be able to know the topology of the network, in real time.
There is a built-in topology module in NOX but it does not allow us to use it in a way that
is useful to us. We decide to build a table where we store the IP addresses of the Virtual
Machines bound to the ID of the switch they are connected to as well as its port. Indeed,
each switch is assigned a Datapath-ID (dpid).
Let Ai be the IP address stored at the i
th line.
Ai ! (dpidi; porti)
This way, we will know right away if the source of the destination machine belongs or not
to the ruled zone.
In order to gure out where to send the other packets to, we need to know where are
the gateways to these other zones. In order to keep track of these gateways, we implement
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a register in a same way it's done in classic networking. We set a default gateway and we
build a dictionary where the key is the IP address of the foreign machine, bound to the
corresponding dpid.
Let Bi be the IP address stored at the i
th line.
Bi ! (dpidi; porti)
These mechanisms allow us to know whether or not the source and destination machines
are located in the zone ruled by the controller.
In case the destination machine does not belong to the current zone, the dpid and the
port of the gateway switch will be stored and a Boolean value representing the wildcard
possibility will be set to true.
In case the source machine does not belong to the current zone, the controller must check
if the packet already has an EEL-tag. If that's the case, this EEL-tag must be extracted.
This tag is a gTag and thus represent a type of middlebox. Once it is retrieved, the security
chain will be trimmed and only the elements of the security chain which haven't been applied
yet will remain. For example, a security chain is composed of three gTags : (gTag1, gTag2,
gTag3). The packet arrives tagged with the second gTag, gTag2, the controller will remove
the rst gTag and the new security chain will be (gTag2, gTag3).
The EEL-tags must be inserted to the packet by the switches. The OpenFlow protocol
1.0 only allows the modication, pushing and popping of the VLAN tag. With 4096 values,
we can use the rst hundred for the middlebox type (i.e. the gTag), and the rest of the values
for the middlebox instance (i.e. iTag).
Therefore, the EEL-tag is retrieved by the controller by checking the presence of a VLAN
tag on the packet.
Determine the Route
Once we gured out the security chain and whether or not the destination machine belongs
to another zone, we must determine the route that the packet must take in order to go to
destination.
We chose to implement a very simple routing protocol. The source switch is known, as
well as the switches connected to the middleboxes to be traversed, and the destination switch.
We then subdivide the route in smaller segments and we calculate the shortest path between
the dierent elements of the route.
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In order to do so, we use the built-in topology discovery module. This module builds and
maintain an adjacency list of the network links and periodically iterates over the discovered
links of the network. This adjacency list is simply a table binding two switch and port
information.
The ith line of the table is as follow :
(dpidi;1; porti;1)! (dpidi;2; porti;2)
We use this table in order to build the shortest path.
However, we have seen that one gTag correspond to several iTags. Thereby, there are
several possible path to go from one point to another.
Furthermore, in the case of a wildcard, the whole security chain does not have to be
traversed, as we can delegate the application of a portion of the chain to the next zone.
Therefore, if a security chain is (gTag1, gTag2, gTag3) and it's possible to delegate part
of the chain to the next zone, then the possible middlebox chains to be traversed in the
current zones are : (gTag1, gTag2, gTag3), (gTag1, gTag2), (gTag1) and even (). The last
combination is the case where the whole chain is delegated to the next zone.
Moreover, for each gTag, there may be several active middlebox instances, represented by
their iTag. In order to determine the route we must apply, we determine all the possibilities
and we calculate the number of hops. The route with the lowest number of hops is chosen.
In case of a wildcard, and if several combinations have the same number of hops, we choose
the one with the highest number of middlebox traversed.
Create and Push the Rules
The last box of the owchart if the most important one. It takes all the previous work
and turn it into concrete routing rules in the data center.
In order to push the ow-entries down the switches, we use the functions dened in the
OF library in nox, by calling import nox.lib.openow as openow in our controller.
In order to dene a ow entry, we must dene the matching attributes and the actions to
be taken.
There are several types of rules that can be set. First, the rules matching the source
and destination eld, as well as the incoming port, when the rst switch receive the freshly
emitted packet. Let's assume that the middlebox chain consist in three tags : (iTag1, iTag2,
iTag3). The action taken by the rst switch will be then to push the iTag1 to the packet
and to route it according to the path which has been calculated in the previous section.
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The switches between the source switch and the rst ingress switch will all have the same
type of rule. Based on the iTag1, the packet will be routed to a particular port. This port
has been calculated during the route calculation.
At the ingress switch of a middlebox, the rule will consist in matching one attribute
and applying two actions. The matching attribute is obviously the tag corresponding to the
middlebox. The packet must then be sent to the middlebox, but before that, the tag must
be popped, so the middlebox receives an unmodied packet.
The egress switch of the middlebox will receive an untagged packet. Based on the source
and destination eld, as well as the port from which the packet arrived, the controller will
have to push the iTag2 down to the packet. A second rule consist in matching this tag and
to route the packet to the adequate port.
The rules set in the forthcoming switches are the same as previous, until we reach the
last middlebox.
From the egress switch of the last middlebox to the destination switch, there are two
cases. First, the destination machine is located in the current zone, and the destination
switch is connected to the destination machine. In that case, the routing in the last segment
is done by matching the destination address.
However, the destination can be located in another zone, in the wildcard case. In this
situation, the tag of the next middlebox to be traversed will be added to the packet. The
routing will then be made based on the tag and the destination address. If all middleboxes
have been traversed, the routing will be done solely based on the destination address
Summary
We explained in this chapter how we implemented the prototype of our solution. The
complete code of the controller can be found in the annex A.
Our prototype is not designed to provide optimized performances but only in order to
provide a proof of concept. Getting this proof of concept is what we aim to do in the next
section.
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CHAPTER 5
TESTING AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The current chapter will cover the tests we want our implementation to go through. We
will explain the scenarios that we created in order to gather the proof we want. We will
describe the test environment as well as the tools we will use. We will end the section by
describing the tools that we created in order to realize the tests.
After the implementation is done and the tests are created, it was time to run the tests
on our implementation. For each point that we want to demonstrate, we ran the test, made
observations on the behavior of the implementation. Thereafter, we analyzed the obtained
results.
Once the analysis is done, it was time to adopt a larger view on our tests, our implemen-
tation and our project. We will expose their limitations as well as the improvements which
can be brought to our model.
For each point that we treat, we want to provide a clear view on the choices we made, as
well as the reasons that brought us to these choices.
5.1 Tests
We want to demonstrate the ability of our system to dynamically enforce security policies,
the latter being consistent in spite of the migration of the nodes. In this chapter, we expose
the tests we want our prototype to pass in order to consider that it corresponds to the
requirements.
The rst part will expose the scenarios that we imagined in order to cover all the use
cases. The second part will expose the tools we chose to use to run these tests and the third
part will present the created components in order to do so.
5.1.1 Scenarios
In order to prove that our system can answer the problems that we highlighted in this
project, we need to create scenarios which are relevant. The scenarios must cover all the
properties we want our model to have.
Explicitly, it means that our system must rstly secure the trac by automatically en-
force security policies. Then, those security policies must stay coherent although nodes are
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migrating across the data center. Finally, all or part of the security policies can be delegated
to another zone when the source and migration machines are not located in the same zone.
Scenario 1 - Dynamically Enforce Security Policies
There are several important words when we say that we want to dynamically enforce
security policies. The rst word is dynamically. It means that the policies are preset at
the network level, and as a node is emitting a packet, the network controller will apply the
adequate policy to the ow without any human intervention.
Another important notion is security policies. We have previously described what it
means : a security policy corresponds to a chain of middlebox to be ensured. The actual
traversal of these middleboxes must be veried. No other middlebox must be traversed.
Therefore, the rst scenario will take place in a network across which are spread middle-
boxes. Two senders will send packets to a receiver. There will be a dierent security policy
for each of the sender. The senders and the receiver of the communication will be located on
two dierent physical servers.
Scenario 2 - Node Migration
The security policies applied to the trac must be coherent even if the nodes are migrat-
ing. In this scenario, the two previous senders of the scenario 1 will migrate to another part
of the data center, on other physical machines.
This scenario aims to prove the property of our model to remain consistent even after
node migration.
Scenario 3 - Wildcard
In a context where the data center can be partitioned in several zones, each ruled by a
specic controller, we identied the possibility of a case we called a wildcard case.
In this case, all or part of the security policy enforcement can be delegated to another
zone.
Our scenario will require two Virtual Machines, located in two dierent zones. In our
scenario, VM1 located in Zone1 will communicate with VM2, located in Zone2.
5.1.2 Tools
In order to realize these tests, we need to simulate a network, in which nodes are migrat-
ing, sending and receiving packets. Furthermore, some of the nodes of the network will be
middleboxes.
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We will rst review the dierent ways existing to create a testbed for our network before
studying what are the ways to simulate the communicating nodes.
For each subsection, we will review the possible solutions before explaining the reason of
our choices.
The Network
In order to run our tests, we need a network supporting OF, controlled by our handcraft
controller. The most important characteristic of this network is that the nodes will migrate.
However, we feel that creating a testbed running an actual cloud operating system would not
be a good idea, as there is no hypervisor providing the capability to insert the AppID into
the packet, as the VM starts emitting.
When a new architecture has to be evaluated, the most usual way to proceed is to use a
network simulator as ns-2/ns-3 or Opnet. These simulators are very powerful and crucial in
order to gather precise measurements on the network behavior.
However, the modeling with such simulator is a very complex and time-consuming task.
As we only want to gather a proof of concept, we believe these simulators are too advanced
to t the best our requirements. It would be like killing a y with a bazooka.
Mininet allows to simply create emulated software-dened networks. The creation of a
topology can be done programatically. Furthermore, graphic terminals can be run on the
nodes, on which scripts can easily be run.
We believe it is complete enough as it creates a virtual emulated network where we can
interact directly with the nodes. Yet, it provides simplicity required to set our scenarios and
run our tests in order to prove the behavior of our system. We believe it is a good trade-o
between a simplicity of a simulation and the realism of a testbed.
The Nodes
Now that we know how we're going to build our network, we can tackle the problem of
the nodes.
First of all, the nodes will have to migrate and yet, there is no migration mechanism in
place in Mininet. However, there is the possibility to run scripts on the nodes of the network.
Therefore, we believe the smartest way to proceed is to script the sending and receiving
of packets. That way, we can simply kill a script and launch it on another node in order to
simulate a migration.
The presence of middleboxes is the second hurdle in our tests.
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Our rst thought was to use actual middleboxes security processes. However, the instal-
lation and the conguration of these processes would be an unnecessary eort as it would not
provide any more realism to our model. Furthermore, the compatibility of these processes
and their adaptation to our installation would be a loss of time.
A security middlebox has a simple behavior. It consists in receiving a packet, detecting
threats based on preset criteria, and if the packet is considered harmless, resend the packet.
From the network point of view, the only behavior we're interested in is the receiving and
sending of a packet.
Therefore, we decide to emulate the behavior of a middlebox with a script. As the
controller is coded in Python, we will create a Python script modeling the middlebox behavior.
All types of nodes are then covered and will be emulated by Python scripts, emitting
and/or receiving packets.
5.1.3 Created Components
All the scenarios have been dened and the tools have been selected.
In this section, we will present the components we created in order to make possible the
realization of the tests. We will rst focus on the creation of a network topology before
presenting the scripts we'll use to emulate the nodes and middleboxes.
The Network
In order to realize the three scenarios mentioned above, we need to create particular
network topologies.
In order to simplify the tests, we think it's better to create a single topology, meeting the
needs of the three scenarios all at once.
From the scenarios analysis, we rst see that the topology must be divided in 2 zones,
each ruled by a specic controller.
The rst zone will be the scene of the two rst scenarios. The rst scenario requires the
creation of the senders nodes and the receiver nodes. In the data center must lie middleboxes.
In order to combine the two scenarios, we will create a symmetrical network where the trac
can go through the same type of middleboxes after migration, in order to demonstrate the
consistency of a security policy despite the dierence of middleboxes instances.
The third scenario is the use of a wildcard. The receiver of the communication established
in the third scenario will therefore have to be in the second zone. Several middleboxes also
have to be in the second zone in order to delegate the traversal of those middleboxes.
We use the Python API provided by Mininet in order to create the custom network
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meeting the requirements mentioned above. The created topology is presented on the Figure
5.1. The code used to generate this topology can be found in the annex B.
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The Nodes
The scenarios are written, the network is set and the controller ready to operate. The
only thing missing at this point is the nodes.
As we have explained at the section 5.1.2, the senders, receivers and middleboxes will be
emulated by Python scripts.
The rst script we implemented was the one designed to receive packets. It simply opens
a socket and listens to incoming packets. When an IP packet is detected, the information
regarding the source and the destination are print on the terminal.
The second script we implemented is the one designed to send packets.
An IP packet is crafted with the adequate information regarding the addresses of the
sender and the receiver as well as the Application ID. A socket is then opened and the packet
is sent out.
The third and last script we implemented is the one designed to emulate the behavior of
middleboxes.
The script opens a socket and listens to incoming packets. When an IP packet is detected,
the information regarding the source and the destination are printed out.
The unmodied packet is then re-sent out to the network.
We decided to use explicit names for our sending scripts, by creating one script per source-
destination combination. For example, the script designed to send packets from the node
h11 (10.0.0.11) to h15 (10.0.0.15) will be named 1115sendpackets.py.
The code of 1115sendpackets.py can be found in annex C. The code of receivepackets.py
can be found in annex D. The code of middlebox.py can be found in annex E.
5.2 Results
As everything is now implemented, the tests can actually be realized. In this section, we'll
analyze the three scenarios independently. For each of them, we'll describe the manipulations
step by step. As the scenarios will unfold, we will describe the behavior of the system. Then,
we will analyze the results of the tests for each scenario.
As the manipulations occur, we will record a video showing the behavior of the dierent
elements of the network. In this thesis, we will present only captures of the video.
In this section, we will often refer to the topology found on the gure 5.1.
The name of the nodes on top of which runs the middlebox scripts are named after their
IP address. For example, the IDS with the IP address 10.0.0.21 is the node h21.
All the ow entries at the OFS level are shown on the annex F.
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5.2.1 Scenario 1 - Automatically Enforce Security Policies
Manipulation
This scenario occurs in Zone 1. We will simulate the communication between the nodes
h11 and h15. This communication is marked with the AppID corresponding to the security
chain (IDS, AppFW).
We will also simulate the communication between the nodes h12 and h16. This com-
munication is marked with the AppID corresponding to the security chain (IDS, AppFW,
DPI).
Observation
As the script 1115sendpackets.py is ran on the node h11, the ow is instantly set across
the switches of the data center. We can see that the middleboxes placed on h21 (IDS) and h22
(AppFW) are traversed. The packet is then received on the node h15, where the information
of the packet is printed.
As the script 1216sendpackets.py is ran on the node h12, the ow is instantly set across
the switches of the data center. We can see that the middleboxes placed on h21 (IDS), h22
(AppFW) and h23 (DPI) are traversed. The packet is then received on the node h16, where
the information of the packet is printed.
The behavior of the network after the script 1115sendpackets.py has been run is shown
on gure 5.2.
Analysis
We can see that in both cases, the security policy has been applied automatically, with-
out a manual intervention. The middlebox sequences has been applied accordingly to the
Application ID present in the packet.
5.2.2 Scenario 2 - Node Migration
We use the scenario 1 as a basis for this new scenario.
Manipulation
Once the communication is established, we simulate the migration of the node h11 to the
location of the node h13 on the right side of zone 1. We will also simulate the migration of
the node h12 to the location of the node h14.
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Figure 5.2 Network behavior after running 1115sendpackets.py
Observation
As the node h11 migrates to h13 and starts emitting packets again, the ow is instantly
set across the switches of the data center. We can see that the security policy is still applied
(IDS, AppFW). However, the instances that are traversed have changed. Before migration,
the ow was going through (h21, h22) meanwhile the new ow is traversing (h25, h24). The
packet is still seamlessly received on the node h15.
The node h12 also migrates to h16. Similarly, before the migration, the ow was going
through (h21, h22, h23) as the new ow is traversing (h25, h24, h23). The packet is still
seamlessly received on the node h15.
The behavior of the network after the migration of h11 in h13 and h12 in h14 is shown
on gure 5.3.
Analysis
We can see that in both cases, the security policy has been recongured automatically
after migration. The middlebox sequences has been applied accordingly to the Application
ID present in the packet, even though the instances traversed have changed. We chose to
show both these cases of migration in order to demonstrate that all or part of the traversed
middlebox instances can be modied.
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Figure 5.3 Network behavior after the migration of h11 and h12
We can conclude that our model ensure the consistency of the security policies even after
the migration of a node.
5.2.3 Scenario 3 - Wildcard
In this scenario, we will establish a communication between two nodes located in two
dierent zones of the data center, ruled by two dierent controllers.
Manipulation
We will simulate the communication between the nodes h12 and h45. The node h12
is located in Zone 1 as the node h45 is located in Zone 2, as shown on gure 5.1. This
communication is marked with the AppID corresponding to the security chain (IDS, AppFW,
DPI).
Once the communication is established, we will migrate the node h12 from the location
h12 to h14, as previous.
Observation
As the node h12 starts emitting packets, the ow is instantly set across the switches of
the data center. We can see that the security policy is applied through the instances (h21,
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h22, h53). The nodes h21 and h22 belong to Zone 1 but the traversal of the DPI has been
delegated to the controller of the second zone.
As we migrate h12 to the location h14, we can see that the security policy is now applied
through the instances (h51, h52, h53). All three nodes h51, h52 and h53 belong to the Zone
2. In this case the controller of Zone 1 delegated all the enforcement of the security policy
to the controller of Zone 2.
The application of the wildcard after the migration of h12 in h14 is shown on gure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 Network behavior after the migration of h12
Analysis
The third scenario shows that the application of a security policy can be applied even
throughout several zones ruled by dierent controllers.
The middlebox sequences has been applied accordingly to the Application ID found in
the packet, and this, in two distinct zones.
We chose to show the migration of the node h12 in order to demonstrate that all or part
of the security policy enforcement can be delegated to another zone.
We can conclude that our model ensure the consistency of the security policies even
throughout several zones.
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5.3 Limitations and Future Work
Our model allows us to dynamically enforce security policies in a multi-tenant cloud
network. In addition, the security policies stay coherent in spite of the node migration.
This chapter will focus on the limitations of the routing protocol of our implementation.
These limitations correspond with the future work that can be done in order to improve our
architecture.
5.3.1 Coherence of the Controllers
The rst issue that has not been addressed in our project is the coherence of the con-
troller. Indeed, one challenge is to implement a way to keep the same conguration on all
the controllers, in order for all the nodes to be treated in a similar fashion.
This is one of the most important future research that we identify for our project.
5.3.2 Coherence of the Middlebox Conguration
Another unresolved issue concerns the coherence of middlebox conguration. Indeed, if
modications are made to the conguration of a middlebox, all middlebox of the same type
will have to be modied simultaneously. If there is no mechanism to ensure this coherence,
it may results in packets treated dierently by the same middlebox type.
5.3.3 Trac Overhead
In our thesis, we presented simple use cases. However, in the complexity of a real data cen-
ter, the topology may be complex. In such a situation, the routing of the packets through the
proper middleboxes may result in complex routes and leads to an important trac overhead.
Such situations has not been studied and the potential overhead has not been measured.
5.3.4 Potential Deadlocks
As the security chain is retrieved at the controller level, it is translated into middlebox
instances to traverse. In the case where there is no middlebox of a certain type, up and
running in a zone of the data center, it may result in the impossibility to enforce the security
policy. In this case, all packets would be dropped.
This case would not be tolerable in a real environment. Deadlock possibilities have not
been studied during this project.
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5.3.5 Routing Protocol
So as to create a prototype of our network controller, we had to implement several modules
in order to demonstrate the relevance of our policy enforcement mechanism. Particularly, a
routing protocol has been implemented in order to gure out the route from the source to
the destination, throughout the middleboxes.
The security policy requires certain types of middleboxes to be traversed, in a particular
order. However, there can be several instances running in the network, for a particular
middlebox type.
Our routing protocol considers the possible routes throughout all the eligible combinations
of instances. The number of hops of each route is calculated.
Such a mechanism is not optimized. Calculating all the possible routes can be time-
consuming and aect the scalability of our system.
However, the prototype we presented is working on a simple and small topology as we
only sought a proof of concept.
Therefore, in order to provide a better solution, the routing protocol will have to be
further studied and optimized.
5.3.6 EEL-tag Implementation
The EEL-tags are used in order to route the packets across the network, inside the data
center. Our model does not require a specic way to insert the iTags and gTags to the
packets. However, as we implemented the solution, we had to choose a way to proceed.
We decided to use the VLAN tag id in order to insert our EEL-tags. The rst version of
the OpenFlow protocol requires for the switches to have the capability of pushing, popping
or modifying VLAN tags.
The current implementation allows us to have more than a hundred middlebox types, and
more than a hundred instances of each type.
If this number would not be high enough, the new OpenFlow protocol allows to push,
pop and modify the MPLS header tag (20 bit long). We believe that it could provide enough
scalability to our model, if needed.
5.3.7 Rule Optimization
The routing based on the EEL-tags enables the aggregation of ows, as several of them
can be matched based on a unique rule, matching an unique tag.
However, no further mechanism has been put in place in order to optimize the ow-entries
at the OF-switch level. Furthermore, the tagging of the ows is done at the middleboxes'
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egress switches. Therefore, we believe the it is where the highest numbers of rules will be.
However, we haven't evaluated the number of these rules. We haven't tried to optimize their
number as well.
5.3.8 Resource Management
In a wildcard case, the controller of a zone has the possibility to delegate the traversal of
middleboxes to another zone.
This decision can be made based on several criteria. First, the overhead caused by the
detour of routing the ow through the middleboxes could be a determining factor. Indeed,
we can easily imagine a case where sending the ow directly to another zone would be the
shortest path. However, it would be dicult to evaluate how such a decision would be a good
trade-o overall. Indeed, it is possible that the shortest path in the rst zone would actually
lead to the longest path, after all zones have been considered.
We believe that the wildcard is a good example that the routing based on the shortest
path is not the most ecient. The selection of the paths could be done while operating
a resource management of the middleboxes. Indeed, if the controller had an information
on the load of the middleboxes, it would be able to allocate the ows equally between the
middleboxes. This would enhance the scalability of the system.
Such a mechanism is out of scope and therefore has not been studied in our work. We
nonetheless believe that it could be a eld of interest for the future works.
5.4 Comparison to solutions from the literature
In the previous sections, we have built and analyzed our solution. We highlighted its
limitations as well as the directions of future work. In the current section, we will compare
our solution to the most relevant ones found in the literature.
In order to do so, we compare them by determining whether they meet criteria key to
the enforcement of security policies in multi-tenant networks. Regarding the solutions of the
literature, we studied their properties in the literature review.
The rst criteria we identied is the need for the trac to be routed through a chain of
middleboxes, or at least one middlebox. The proof of concept clearly shows that the trac
is routed through chains of middleboxes.
Furthermore, the tracs of the dierent tenants has to be isolated from each other. As our
solution builds on Software-Dened Network, the isolation is done as the ows are matched
based on characteristics such as the source and destination addresses.
Scalability is another key requirement for any system operating in a cloud environment.
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As it is dicult to evaluate the actual numbers of nodes in a cloud environment, we provide
scalability by allowing the data center to be partitioned in smaller zones, each zone being
ruled by a particular controller. The proof of concept showed how the interaction between
several zones are made, by delegating the enforcement of part or all of a policy to another
zone.
One of the key issues we identied is the need for the enforcement of policies to be done
automatically. Indeed, the size of the data centers don't allow a manual enforcement, as it
would cost too much time and manpower. The proof of concept showed that as the packets
are sent, the enforcement of the security policies is done automatically, without any human
intervention.
The tolerance to migration is another key aspect of any system operating in the cloud.
Our proof of concept proves that upon a node's migration, the path is recalculated and
enforced in order to provide the same middlebox chain, even though it could be applied
using dierent middlebox instances.
A comparison of the algorithms can be found in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Comparison of algorithms
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
All good things come to an end, and this project is no exception.
As we enter the last chapter of this work, we are going to review all the progress that
has been done since the enunciation of the problem we tackled in this project, the dynamic
enforcement of security policies in multi-tenant cloud networks.
Applying security policies is not new, but the cloud brings on new requirements that
we must meet. We started our report with the review of the literature. Some research
has addressed the issue of network security by developing solutions enabling the traversal of
middleboxes.
However, no solution succeeds to provide the consistency of the security policies despite
the node migration.
6.1 The Research Project
We developed a model based on Software-Dened Network, and particularly OpenFlow,
the most advanced protocol in this area to date. A centralized controller will operate on a
set of switches. Those switches will send to the controller any packet belonging to a new
ow.
As the controller receives this packet, it retrieves the AppID inserted in the packet by the
hypervisor. This AppID corresponds to a security policy, in the form of a chain of middlebox
type, represented by gTags. This chain of middleboxes is then translated in iTags, each iTag
corresponding to an actual running middlebox instance of the network.
The controller then identies the path from the source to the destination and throughout
the selected middlebox instances. The routing rules are pushed down to all forwarding
elements along the path.
The iTags are set by the switches to the packets, in order for them to be routed to the
adequate middleboxes. The use of those tags allows us to aggregate many ows with one
rule.
This mechanism allows us to recongure the rules upon each migration of the nodes. As
the migrated machine starts emitting packets again, the same process as previous is followed,
and the security policy is applied. The enforcement of the security policy may be done
through dierent middlebox instances from the ones traversed prior to the migration.
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In order to improve the scalability of our model, we allow the data center to be partitioned
in smaller zones, each ruled by one controller. Our controller design allows the security policy
to be applied throughout several zones, as the controller of the rst zone can delegate the
application of all or part of the middlebox chain to the next zone controller.
We further built a prototype of our solution, in order to prove the viability of our concept.
We imagined several scenarios so as to cover all the situations we believe are relevant to
our project.
Our tests rstly prove that the enforcement of the security is done automatically, without
any human intervention. The middlebox sequence traversed corresponds to the one dened
in the security policies.
When a node migrates, our second test demonstrates that the security policy is still
applied after the migration. Indeed, the paths are recongured as the VM starts emitting
packets again. The enforcement of the security policy can be realized through dierent
instances of the middleboxes.
The last test we implemented demonstrates the wildcard mechanism. It proves that the
enforcement of the security policy can be achieved throughout several zones, ruled by distinct
controllers.
6.2 Limitations
We designed a mechanism in order to ensure the consistency of the security policies in spite
of the migrations of the nodes. Our implementation is not designed with any performance
requirements, as the complete system is not only depending on our mechanism but mostly
to the route calculation module.
The routing of the packets is implemented in a very simple way and we believe that future
work should focus on the optimization of the routing rules. Indeed, we believe it is the key
element in order to create an architecture with good enough performance to be implemented
in a production cloud.
Furthermore, the tests have been implemented in a simple network. Our model could
suer trac overhead under a complex topology. This aspect has not been studied in the
project.
Moreover, a distributed architecture could be very dicult to manage, as there is no way
to maintain the coherence between the controllers.
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6.3 Future work
Future work should focus on the wildcard mechanism and the resource management pos-
sibilities that it oers. Indeed, the delegation of middlebox traversal to another data center
imposes to have rules on which to make the decision on the delegation. Our prototype does
it in a very simple way, as it only chooses the shortest path among the dierent routing
possibilities.
We believe that it would be interesting to balance the load between the dierent middle-
boxes, thus enhancing the scalability of our solution.
I would also important to provide a mechanism to keep the conguration coherent be-
tween the controllers. A similar mechanism could be implemented for the middleboxes.
All good things come to an end, and this conclusion paragraph is no exception.
This project contributes to the security of the cloud at the network level. The focus of
the whole community is today on the cloud, as it is a rising technology. The next generation
will use computers in a way we can only dream about for the moment.
Few are the visionaries able to predict what the future of computing will be. However,
we believe the brighter days are still to come for cloud computing.
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APPENDICES A
controller.py
# EEL Con t ro l l e r
# Zone 1
import l o gg ing
import array
import sys
#import pcap
import s t r i n g
import time
import socke t
import s t r u c t
import nox . l i b . openf low as openf low
from s t r u c t import 
from nox . l i b . core import 
from nox . l i b . packet . e the rne t import e the rne t
from nox . l i b . packet . p a c k e t u t i l s import mac to str , mac to int ,
i p s t r t o i n t
from nox . netapps . topo logy . pytopology import 
from nox . netapps . au then t i c a to r . py f l owu t i l import Flow in event
from nox . netapps . rout ing import pyrout ing
from nox . netapps . d i s cove ry . d i s cove ry import 
from nox . l i b . n e t i n e t import ne t i n e t
from nox . coreapps . pyrt . pycomponent import CONTINUE
log = logg ing . getLogger ( ' nox . coreapps . t u t o r i a l . p y t u t o r i a l ' )
class py tu t o r i a l (Component ) :
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def i n i t ( s e l f , c tx t ) :
Component . i n i t ( s e l f , c tx t )
s e l f . r out ing = None
s e l f . d i s cove ry = None
# This t a b l e i s c rea t ed in order to keep t rack o f ho s t s connected
to sw i t ch e s .
# i t i s i n i t i a l i z e empty
s e l f . mac ip to sw i t ch po r t = fg # key : ( IP addr ) ; va lue : ( dpid ,
por t )
# example pour EEL topo : f(13L, 167772173) : (9L , 2) , (4L ,
167772164) : (10L, 3) , (3L , 167772163) : (10L , 2) , (12L,
167772172) : (8L , 2) , (2L , 167772162) : (5L , 2) , (1L , 167772161) :
(5L , 1) , (11L, 167772171) : (7L , 2)g
# t h i s t a b l e l i n k s the EEL gTag to the EEL iTag range to which i t
corresponds
s e l f . gtags = f
1 : (128 ,255) , # DPI
2 : (256 ,383) , # AppFW
3 : (384 ,513) , # IDS
4 : (514 ,639) , # IPS
5 : (640 ,767) # FW
g #gtag < > i t a g range
# t h i s t a b l e l i n k s the App l i ca t i on IDs (AppIDs) to the s e c u r i t y
cha ins they r ep re s en t
s e l f . app id = f # dans l a chaine l ' i nd i c e commence a 0
1 : ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) , # dpi appfw i d s
2 : ( 3 , 2 ) , # id s appfw
3 : ( 1 , 2 , 5 ) , # dpi appfw fw
4 : ( 1 , 4 , 5 ) , # dpi i p s fw
5 : ( 2 , 3 , 5 ) , # appfw i d s fw
6 : ( 3 , 5 ) , # id s fw
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7 : ( 3 , 2 , 1 ) , # id s appw dpi
8 : ( 2 , 5 ) # appfw fw
g #app id < > g tag chain
# t h i s t a b l e l i n k s the EEL iTags to the MAC and IP address o f the
s e c u r i t y app l i ance
s e l f . i t a g s = f
421 : (1 , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 1 " ) , # IDS
425 : (1 , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 " ) , # IDS
322 : (1 , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 2 " ) , # AppFW
324 : (1 , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 4 " ) , # AppFW
223 : (1 , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 3 " ) # DPI
g #i t a g < > (mac , ip adress )
s e l f . gateway = f
" 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 4 5 " : (10L , 2 ) , # 10 .0 . 0 . 45 i s in the zone l i n k e d on the
por t 2 o f sw i t ch 10
g #i t a g < > (mac , ip adress )
# t h i s f unc t i on i s c a l l e d when an unr e g i s t e r e d hos t i s d i s cove r ed .
# The MAC and IP addres se s o f the new hos t s are s t o r ed in the
t a b l e , l i n k e d to the datapath ID and i t s por t through which the
packe t a r r i v ed
def l e a rn ( s e l f , ip addr , dpid , i npor t ) :
s e l f . mac ip to sw i t ch po r t [ ip addr ] = ( dpid , i npo r t )
# used to r e g i s t e r ip addres se s o f ho s t s from other reg i ons
# The IP address i s l i n k e d to the gateway datapath
def l earn gateway ( s e l f , ip addr , dpid , i npor t ) :
s e l f . gateway [ ip addr ] = ( dpid , i npo r t )
# func t i on : checks f o r an EEL tag on the packet , in case o f a
wi l dcard case incoming from another reg ion
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def c h e c k e e l t a g ( s e l f , buf ) :
#i s t a g g e d = buf . t o l i s t ( ) . f i n d ( ' mpls ' )
return 0
# func t i on : r e turns the s e c u r i t y chain ( gTag chain ) from a g iven
AppID
def r e t r i e v e c h a i n ( s e l f , app id ) :
chain = s e l f . app id [ i n t ( app id ) ]
return chain
# ob s o l e t
def l e a rn and fo rward ( s e l f , dpid , inport , packet , buf , bu f id ) :
# I n i t i a l hub behav ior : f l o o d packe t out e v e r y t h in g but input por t
.
s e l f . send openf low ( dpid , buf id , buf , openf low .OFPP FLOOD, inpor t )
# for a g iven MAC, IP couple , r e tu rns 1 i f i t ' s in the hos t t a b l e ,
0 o the rw i s e ( used to check i f a w i l dcard i s p o s s i b l e )
def i s d s t i n t a b l e ( s e l f , ip ) :
i f ip in s e l f . mac ip to sw i t ch po r t . keys ( ) :
return 1
else :
return 0
# re turns the (DPID,PORT) swi t ch a s s o c i a t e d to a host , based on i t
' s MAC, IP addres se s
def ge t sw i t ch ( s e l f , ip ) :
return s e l f . mac ip to sw i t ch po r t [ ip ]
# return a l l the i n f o o f the packe t : [ r e g i s t e r , has app id ,
s addr , d addr , app id , e e l t a g ]
def g e t i n f o ( s e l f , packet ) :
r e g i s t e r = 0
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has app id = 0
s addr = 0
d addr = 0
ip op t = 0
e e l t a g = 0
#parse e t h e rne t header
e th l eng th = 14
head length = eth l eng th
eth header = packet [ : e th l eng th ]
eth = unpack ( ' ! 6 s6sH ' , e th header )
e t h p r o t o c o l = socket . ntohs ( eth [ 2 ] )
#pr in t " e th p ro t o co l " , e t h p r o t o c o l
#Parse ARP packe t s
i f e th p r o t o c o l == 1544 :
r e g i s t e r = 1
a rp p ro t o co l = s t r ( packet [ 1 6 ] ) + s t r ( packet [ 1 7 ] )
i f a rp p ro t o co l != "80" :
print "no ip "
s addr = s t r ( packet [ 2 8 ] ) + " . " + s t r ( packet [ 2 9 ] ) + " . " + s t r (
packet [ 3 0 ] ) + " . " + s t r ( packet [ 3 1 ] )
# Parse VLAN header
i f e th p r o t o c o l == 129 :
r e g i s t e r = r e g i s t e r + 2
v l an l eng th = 4
vlan header = packet [ e th l eng th : v l an l eng th+eth l eng th ]
vlanh = unpack ( ' !HH' , v lan header )
e e l t a g = vlanh [ 0 ]
e t h p r o t o c o l = socket . ntohs ( vlanh [ 1 ] )
head length = head length + v lan l eng th
i f e th p r o t o c o l == 8 :
#Parse IP header
#take f i r s t 24 charac t e r s f o r the ip header ( c l a s s i c header +
op t ions )
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ip heade r = packet [ head length :24+ head length ]
#now unpack them : )
iph = unpack ( ' !BBHHHBBH4s4sBBBB ' , ip heade r )
v e r s i o n i h l = iph [ 0 ]
v e r s i on = v e r s i o n i h l >> 4
i h l = v e r s i o n i h l & 0xF
iph l eng th = i h l  4
t t l = iph [ 5 ]
p r o to co l = iph [ 6 ]
# i f i t ' s not UDP
i f pro to co l != 1 :
# ignor ing ICMP packe t s
r e g i s t e r = r e g i s t e r + 1
has app id = 1
s addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 8 ] ) ;
d addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 9 ] ) ;
i p op t = iph [ 1 0 ]
return [ r e g i s t e r , has app id , s addr , d addr , ip opt , e e l t a g ]
# ca l c u l a t e the rou t e s based on the segments
def f i n d r ou t e ( s e l f , segments ) :
a l l my rou t e s = l i s t ( )
for segment in segments :
# the route r ep r e s en t s the l i n k a g e o f dpid / por t a long a segment
myroute = l i s t ( )
f o rb i dden rou t e s = l i s t ( )
f i r s t = segment [ 0 ]
next = f i r s t
l a s t = segment [ 1 ]
route incomple t e = 1
r o u t e p o s s i b l e = 1
go on = 1
forb idden = 0
no match = 1
bug in rou t e = 0
while go on :
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r o u t e p o s s i b l e = 1
while route incomple t e & r o u t e p o s s i b l e :
for row in s e l f . d i s cove ry . a d j a c e n c y l i s t :
no match = 1
forb idden = 0
i f row [ 0 ] == next :
# check i f the next hop i sn ' t a l r eady in the route
for seg in myroute :
i f seg [ 0 ] == row [ 2 ] :
f o rb idden = 1
for f o rb idden rou t e in f o rb i dden r ou t e s :
i f ( f o rb idden rou t e [ 0 ] == next ) & ( f o rb idden rou t e [ 1 ] == row [ 2 ] ) :
f o rb idden = 1
i f f o rb idden != 1 :
no match = 0
myroute . append ( ( row [ 0 ] , row [ 1 ] ) )
i f row [ 2 ] == l a s t :
r oute incomple t e = 0
go on = 0
break
else :
next = row [ 2 ]
break
i f row [ 2 ] == next :
for seg in myroute :
i f seg [ 0 ] == row [ 0 ] :
f o rb idden = 1
for f o rb idden rou t e in f o rb i dden r ou t e s :
i f ( f o rb idden rou t e [ 0 ] == next ) & ( f o rb idden rou t e [ 1 ] == row [ 0 ] ) :
f o rb idden = 1
i f f o rb idden != 1 :
no match = 0
myroute . append ( ( row [ 2 ] , row [ 3 ] ) )
i f row [ 0 ] == l a s t :
r oute incomple t e = 0
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go on = 0
break
else :
next = row [ 0 ]
break
i f no match :
r o u t e p o s s i b l e = 0
i f l en (myroute ) == 0 :
print " ERROR : no route found"
go on = 0
bug in rou t e = 1
else :
f o r b i dden rou t e s . append ( ( myroute [ l en (myroute )  1 ] [ 0 ] , next ) )
myroute = l i s t ( )
next = f i r s t
a l l my rou t e s . append (myroute )
f o rb i dden rou t e s = l i s t ( )
return a l l my rou t e s
# return the i n g r e s s sw i t ch based on the middlebox in s tance i t a g
def ge t mid sw i t che s ( s e l f , i t a g i n s t a n c e s ) :
mid switches = l i s t ( )
# i f on ly one element
i f type ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s ) == type ( tup l e ( ) ) :
mid switches . append ( s e l f . g e t sw i t ch ( i p s t r t o i n t ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s
[ 1 ] ) ) )
else :
for sw in i t a g i n s t a n c e s :
mid switches . append ( s e l f . g e t sw i t ch ( i p s t r t o i n t ( sw [ 1 ] ) ) )
return mid switches
# parameters : the i t a g chain , the s rc and ds t sw i t ch e s
# crea t e and re turn the segments o f route
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def get segments ( s e l f , mid switches , s r c sw i t ch , d s t sw i t ch ) :
# we s p l i t the en t i r e route from src hos t to d s t hos t in sub 
segment , s rc hos t to 1 s t middlebox , 1 s t middlebox to 2nd . . . .
segments = l i s t ( )
# i f t he r e i s no midd leboxes to t rave r s e , on ly one segment
i f l en ( mid switches ) == 0 :
segments . append ( ( s r c sw i t c h [ 0 ] , d s t sw i t ch [ 0 ] ) )
# when midd leboxes need to be t raver sed , we determine the segments
else :
# src hos t  > 1 s t middlebox
segments . append ( ( s r c sw i t c h [ 0 ] , mid switches [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ) )
# between midd leboxes
i f l en ( mid switches ) > 1 :
for i in range (0 , l en ( mid switches )   1) :
segments . append ( ( mid switches [ i ] [ 0 ] , mid switches [ i +1 ] [ 0 ] ) )
# l a s t middlebox  > ds t hos t
segments . append ( ( mid switches [ l en ( mid switches )  1 ] [ 0 ] , d s t sw i t ch
[ 0 ] ) )
return segments
# de f a u l t f unc t i on c a l l e d when the pa c k e t i n event i s r a i s ed
def pa ck e t i n c a l l b a c k ( s e l f , dpid , inport , reason , length , buf id ,
packet ) :
"""Packet in hand ler """
i f not packet . parsed :
l og . debug ( ' I gnor ing incomplete packet ' )
else :
p a ck e t i n f o = s e l f . g e t i n f o ( packet . a r r )
# we learn the host< >sw i t ch l i n k
i f ( pa ck e t i n f o [0]==1) :
s r c i p = pack e t i n f o [ 2 ]
# we r e g i s t e r the new packe t in the host< >sw i t ch t a b l e
s e l f . l e a rn ( i p s t r t o i n t ( s r c i p ) , dpid , i npor t )
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print "packet r e g i s t e r e d . t ab l e : " , s e l f . mac ip to sw i t ch po r t
# we learn the host< >gateway sw i t ch l i n k
i f ( pa ck e t i n f o [ 0 ] == 3) :
s r c i p = pack e t i n f o [ 2 ]
# we r e g i s t e r the new packe t in the host< >sw i t ch t a b l e
s e l f . l earn gateway ( s r c i p , dpid , i npo r t )
print "gateway r e g i s t e r e d . t ab l e : " , s e l f . gateway
# we t e s t i f the encapsu la t ed r e c e i v ed packe t i s an IP packet ,
o the rw i s e we j u s t r e g i s t e r i t in the t a b l e
# i f the packe t con ta ins an App IP :
i f ( pa ck e t i n f o [ 1 ] ) :
s r c i p = pack e t i n f o [ 2 ]
d s t i p = pack e t i n f o [ 3 ]
app id = pack e t i n f o [ 4 ]
# va r i a b l e r ep r e s en t i n g the source datapath
s r c sw i t c h = ( dpid , i npo r t )
# determine the g tag s e c u r i t y chain
s e c u r i t y c h a i n = s e l f . r e t r i e v e c h a i n ( app id )
# determine whether or not the packe t comes from another reg ion
and tagged
f rom wi ldcard = pack e t i n f o [ 5 ]
# trim the s e c u r i t y chain when the packe t s has been wi ldcarded in
another reg ion
i f ( f rom wi ldcard != 0) :
new chain = l i s t ( )
i s i n c h a i n = 0
# for each element in the s e c u r i t y chain , we check i f i t
corresponds to the EEL tag found on the wi l dcard packe t
# coming from another reg ion . The new s e c u r i t y chain beg in s at
t h i s g tag
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for gtag in s e c u r i t y c h a i n :
i f gtag == from wi ldcard :
i s i n c h a i n = 1
i f i s i n c h a i n :
new chain . append ( gtag )
s e c u r i t y c h a i n = new chain
# checks i f i t ' s p o s s i b l e to do a wi l dcard
i s d s t r e a c h a b l e = s e l f . i s d s t i n t a b l e ( i p s t r t o i n t ( d s t i p ) )
i t a g r ang e s = l i s t ( )
i t a g i n s t a n c e s = l i s t ( )
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s = l i s t ( )
# i f the d e s t i n a t i on i s known , we ge t the i n g r e s s sw i t ch o f the
d e s t i n a t i o n machine
i f i s d s t r e a c h a b l e == 1 :
d s t sw i t ch = s e l f . g e t sw i t ch ( i p s t r t o i n t ( d s t i p ) )
# determiner l e s in s tance a t rave r s e r , f a i r e un i t a g c h a i n
for gtag in s e c u r i t y c h a i n :
i t a g r ang e s . append ( s e l f . g tags [ gtag ] )
# we determine the a c t ua l i n s t ance s to be t r a v e r s ed
for i in range ( l en ( i t a g r ang e s ) ) :
a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s = l i s t ( )
j = 0
# we ge t the a v a i l a b l e i n s t ance s f o r a g iven middlebox type
for i t a g in range ( i t a g r ang e s [ i ] [ 0 ] , i t a g r ang e s [ i ] [ 1 ] ) :
i f i t a g in s e l f . i t a g s . keys ( ) :
i n s t a n c e i n f o = s e l f . i t a g s [ i t a g ]
i f i n s t a n c e i n f o [ 0 ] : # the a v a i l a b l e b i t
a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s . append ( ( i tag , i n s t a n c e i n f o [ 1 ] ) ) # the ip
address
j = j + 1
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L = len ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s )
# i f t he r e i s more than one a v a i l a b l e ins tances , we mu l t i p l i a t e
the i tems in the i t a g i n s t an c e s comb ina t i on
# in order to c r ea t e a l l the combinat ions o f a v a i l a b l e i n s t ance s
i f j > 1 :
for k in range ( l en ( a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s ) 1) :
for n in range (L) : # we d emu l t i p l i a t e the cha ins
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ n ] )
# we now add the a v a i l a b l e i n s t ance s to the chain con ta in ing the
in s t ance s corresponding o f the prev ious g t a g s
i f L > 0 :
for k in range ( l en ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s ) ) :
n = abs (k/L) # used to determine which in s tance to append on
which l i n e
t emp l ine = l i s t ( )
t emp l ine . append ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] )
t emp l ine . append ( a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s [ n ] )
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] = temp l ine
else :
# l i s t e vide , on met l ' e lement
for i n s t anc e in a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s :
#temp = l i s t ( )
#temp . append ( in s tance )
#i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( temp )
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( in s t ance )
else :
i f L > 0 :
for k in range ( l en ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s ) ) :
temp = l i s t ( )
i f type ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] ) == type ( tup l e ( ) ) :
temp . append ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] )
else :
for elem in i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] :
temp . append ( elem ) # sinon : on append dans l a l i g n e k en crean
j u s t une r e f
temp . append ( a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s [ 0 ] )
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i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] = temp
else :
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s [ 0 ] )
print " i t a g i n s t an c e s combinations . . . " ,
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s
# the d e s t i n a t i o n i s in a reg ion ru l ed by another c o n t r o l l e r .
# we ge t the gateway sw i t ch which acces s the o ther reg ion
i f i s d s t r e a c h a b l e == 0 :
print " d e s t i n a t i on not reachab l e "
d s t sw i t ch = s e l f . gateway [ d s t i p ]
for gtag in s e c u r i t y c h a i n :
i t a g r ang e s . append ( s e l f . g tags [ gtag ] )
# we determine the a c t ua l i n s t ance s to be t r a v e r s ed
for i in range ( l en ( i t a g r ang e s ) ) :
a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s = l i s t ( )
j = 0
# we ge t the a v a i l a b l e i n s t ance s f o r a g iven middlebox type
for i t a g in range ( i t a g r ang e s [ i ] [ 0 ] , i t a g r ang e s [ i ] [ 1 ] ) :
i f i t a g in s e l f . i t a g s . keys ( ) :
i n s t a n c e i n f o = s e l f . i t a g s [ i t a g ]
i f i n s t a n c e i n f o [ 0 ] : # the a v a i l a b l e b i t
a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s . append ( ( i tag , i n s t a n c e i n f o [ 1 ] ) ) # the ip
address
j = j + 1
L = len ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s )
i f L == 0 :
for i n s t in a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s :
temp = l i s t ( )
temp . append ( i n s t )
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i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( temp)
else :
max len = 0
for elem in i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s :
i f l en ( elem ) > max len :
max len = len ( elem )
for i n s t in a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s :
for k in range (L) :
i f l en ( i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] ) == max len :
temp = l i s t ( )
for elem in i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ k ] :
temp . append ( elem ) # sinon : on append dans l a l i g n e k en crean
j u s t une r e f
temp . append ( i n s t )
i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s . append ( temp)
# f i r s t we c a l c u l a t e the r e f e r ence
i t a g i n s t a n c e s = i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s [ 0 ]
print " r e f i t a g i n s t an c e s . . . " , i t a g i n s t a n c e s
# when the r e i s a w i l dcard p o s s i b i l i t y , the r e f route i s the one
wi thou t any middlebox
i f i s d s t r e a c h a b l e == 0 :
print " t ry ing get mid with i t a g empty"
i t a g i n s t a n c e s = [ ]
# determine the sw i t ch e s to whi tch are a t tached the midd leboxes
# t h i s v a r i a b l e r ep r e s en t s the DPID and PORT l i n k e d to the
midd leboxes
mid switches = s e l f . g e t mid sw i t che s ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s )
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segments = s e l f . get segments ( mid switches , s r c sw i t ch , d s t sw i t ch )
# now fo r each segment
# we keep t rack o f the current segment through the segment index
v a r i a b l e
segment index = 0
f i n a l a c t i o n s = l i s t ( )
t h e r ou t e s = s e l f . f i n d r ou t e ( segments )
l o ngu eu r r e f = 0
for route in t h e r ou t e s :
l o n gu eu r r e f = l ongu eu r r e f + len ( route )
# then we check the l e n g t h s o f the o ther rou t e s and r ep l a c e i f
necessary
for i t a g cha i n in i t a g i n s t an c e s c omb ina t i on s :
# determine the sw i t ch e s to whi tch are a t tached the midd leboxes
# t h i s v a r i a b l e r ep r e s en t s the DPID and PORT l i n k e d to the
midd leboxes
mid switches temp = s e l f . g e t mid sw i t che s ( i t a g cha i n )
segments temp = s e l f . get segments ( mid switches temp , s r c sw i t ch ,
d s t sw i t ch )
the routes temp = s e l f . f i n d r ou t e ( segments temp )
longueur route = 0
for route in the routes temp :
l ongueur route = longueur route + len ( route )
i f l ongueur route < l o n gu eu r r e f :
l o n gu eu r r e f = longueur route
i t a g i n s t a n c e s = i t a g cha i n
th e r ou t e s = the routes temp
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mid switches = mid switches temp
segments = segments temp
i f l ongueur route == l ongu eu r r e f :
i f l en ( i t a g cha i n ) > l en ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s ) :
l o n gu eu r r e f = longueur route
i t a g i n s t a n c e s = i t a g cha i n
th e r ou t e s = the routes temp
mid switches = mid switches temp
segments = segments temp
print " i t a g i n s t an c e s . . . " , i t a g i n s t a n c e s
print " c a l c u l a t ed f i n a l route s : " , t h e r ou t e s
print " route f i n a l l ength : " , l o n gu eu r r e f
t o w i ld ca rd = [0 , 0 ]
# we ge t the gateway sw i t ch which acces s the o ther reg ion
i f i s d s t r e a c h a b l e == 0 :
gtag index = len ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s )
i f gtag index < l en ( s e c u r i t y c h a i n ) :
t o w i ld ca rd = [ 1 , s e c u r i t y c h a i n [ g tag index ] ]
print " to wi ldcard : " , t o w i ld ca rd
# se t r u l e s
for segment in segments :
print "segment index " , segment index
print " the segment : " , segment
myroute = the r ou t e s [ segment index ]
print "myroute : " , myroute
nb middlebox = 0
# va r i a b l e r ep r e s en t i n g the number o f midd leboxes
i f ( type ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s ) == type ( tup l e ( ) ) ) & ( l en ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s )
== 2) :
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nb middlebox = 1
else :
nb middlebox = len ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s )
# for the l a s t segment : l a s t middlebox  > ds t hos t . . . no more
EEL tags are r equ i r ed
####################################### todo : i f wi ldcard , EEL
tag pre sen t and rou t ing acco rd ing l y
i f ( segment index +1) > nb middlebox :
for i in range (0 , l en (myroute ) ) :
# each sw i t ch needs to route the packe t based on the source and
d e s t i n a t i o n
a t t r s = fg
a t t r s [ core .DL SRC] = packet . s r c
a t t r s [ core .DL DST] = packet . dst
# for the f i r s t sw i t ch on the segment , we check the source por t as
we l l , e xcep t t h e r e i s no middlebox t r a v e r s ed
i f ( i == 0) & ( l en ( mid switches ) != 0) :
a t t r s [ core . IN PORT] = mid switches [ segment index  1 ] [ 1 ]
i f ( i == 0) & ( to w i ld ca rd [ 0 ] ) :
print "put wi ldcard tag "
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT SET VLAN VID, to w i ld ca rd [ 1 ] ] , [
openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
## i f no mid sw i t c h e s has been t r a v e r s ed we need to s e t the f i n a l
a c t i on s
i f ( l en ( mid switches )==0) :
print " f i n a l a c t i on s put wi ldcard tag "
f i n a l a c t i o n s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT SET VLAN VID, f rom wi ldcard ] , [
openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
else :
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
dp id = myroute [ i ] [ 0 ]
# match src d s t : rou te
s e l f . i n s t a l l d a t a p a t h f l ow ( dp id , a t t r s , 60 , 60 , ac t ions ,
b u f f e r i d=None , p r i o r i t y=openflow .OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY, inpor t=
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None , packet=None )
print " s e t r u l e to dpid " , dp id
print "and route outport " , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ]
print " i " , i
# for the l a s t sw i t ch :
a t t r s = fg
a t t r s [ core .DL SRC] = packet . s r c
a t t r s [ core .DL DST] = packet . dst
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , d s t sw i t ch [ 1 ] ] ] ]
dp id = ds t sw i t ch [ 0 ]
# match src d s t : rou te to f i n a l machine
s e l f . i n s t a l l d a t a p a t h f l ow ( dp id , a t t r s , 60 , 60 , ac t ions ,
b u f f e r i d=None , p r i o r i t y=openflow .OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY, inpor t=
None , packet=None )
print " s e t r u l e to l a s t dpid " , dp id
print " outport " , d s t sw i t ch [ 1 ]
print " i " , i
# for any segment t ha t ends wi th an middlebox i n g r e s s sw i t ch
else :
# determine the e e l t a g to app ly
i f type ( i t a g i n s t a n c e s ) == type ( tup l e ( ) ) :
e e l t a g = i t a g i n s t a n c e s [ 0 ]
else :
e e l t a g = i t a g i n s t a n c e s [ segment index ] [ 0 ]
for i in range (0 , l en (myroute ) ) :
# f i r s t sw i t ch o f the segment needs to put the EEL tag AND route
the packe t
i f i == 0 :
i f segment index == 0 :
i f ( f rom wi ldcard != 0) :
f i n a l a c t i o n s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT STRIP VLAN, 0 ] , [ openf low .
OFPAT SET VLAN VID, e e l t a g ] , [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute
[ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
else :
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f i n a l a c t i o n s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT SET VLAN VID, e e l t a g ] , [ openf low .
OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
a t t r s = fg
a t t r s [ core .DL SRC] = packet . s r c
a t t r s [ core .DL DST] = packet . dst
i f segment index != 0 :
a t t r s [ core . IN PORT] = mid switches [ segment index  1 ] [ 1 ]
# i f the packe t i s from wi ldcard , we match the tag and pop i t
i f ( f rom wi ldcard != 0) & ( segment index == 0) :
print " s t r i p vlan id "
a t t r s [ core .DL VLAN] = from wi ldcard
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT STRIP VLAN, 0 ] , [ openf low .
OFPAT SET VLAN VID, e e l t a g ] , [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 ,
myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
else :
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT SET VLAN VID, e e l t a g ] , [ openf low .
OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
dp id = myroute [ i ] [ 0 ]
# match from src to d s t : i n s e r t the EEL TAG
s e l f . i n s t a l l d a t a p a t h f l ow ( dp id , a t t r s , 60 , 60 , ac t ions ,
b u f f e r i d=None , p r i o r i t y=openflow .
OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY, inpor t=None , packet=None )
print " s e t r u l e to dpid " , dp id
print " from s r c to dst . put e e l t a g " , e e l t a g
print "and route outport " , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ]
print " i " , i
# other sw i t c h e s o f the segment needs to route the packe t based on
the EEL tag
else :
# a l l o ther sw i t c h e s needs to route the packe t based on the EEL
tag
a t t r s = fg
a t t r s [ core .DL VLAN] = e e l t a g
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT, [ 0 , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
dp id = myroute [ i ] [ 0 ]
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# match EEL tag : route
s e l f . i n s t a l l d a t a p a t h f l ow ( dp id , a t t r s , 60 , 60 , ac t ions ,
b u f f e r i d=None , p r i o r i t y=openflow .
OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY, inpor t=None , packet=None )
print " s e t r u l e to dpid " , dp id
print "match e e l tag " , e e l t a g
print "and route outport " , myroute [ i ] [ 1 ]
print " i " , i
# l a s t sw i t ch o f the segment needs to pop the EEL tag
# a l s o needs to route towards the middlebox
a t t r s = fg
a t t r s [ core .DL VLAN] = e e l t a g
a c t i on s = [ [ openf low .OFPAT STRIP VLAN, 0 ] , [ openf low .OFPATOUTPUT,
[ 0 , mid switches [ segment index ] [ 1 ] ] ] ]
dp id = mid switches [ segment index ] [ 0 ]
# match e e l t a g : pop the EEL TAG and route through appropr ia t e
por t
s e l f . i n s t a l l d a t a p a t h f l ow ( dp id , a t t r s , 60 , 60 , ac t ions ,
b u f f e r i d=None , p r i o r i t y=openf low .OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY, inpor t=
None , packet=None )
print " s e t r u l e to dpid " , dp id
print "pop e e l tag " , e e l t a g
print " outport " , mid switches [ segment index ] [ 1 ]
print " i " , i
segment index =segment index + 1
# at the end we must send the packe t to the f i r s t swi tch , because
i t was sen t to the c o n t r o l l e r and i t s p roce s s ing needs to be
resumed
s e l f . send openf low ( dpid , buf id , packet , f i n a l a c t i o n s , i npor t )
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return CONTINUE
def i n s t a l l ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . r out ing = s e l f . r e s o l v e ( pyrout ing . PyRouting )
s e l f . d i s cove ry = s e l f . r e s o l v e ( d i s cove ry )
s e l f . r e g i s t e r f o r p a c k e t i n ( s e l f . p a c k e t i n c a l l b a c k )
def g e t I n t e r f a c e ( s e l f ) :
return s t r ( py tu t o r i a l )
def getFactory ( ) :
class Factory :
def i n s t anc e ( s e l f , c tx t ) :
return py tu t o r i a l ( c tx t )
return Factory ( )
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APPENDICES B
EEL-topo.py
#!/ usr / b in /python
"""
This example c r e a t e s a mult i c o n t r o l l e r network f o r the
demonstrat ion o f the EEL c o n t r o l l e r .
by RaaverooK
"""
from mininet . net import Mininet
from mininet . node import Contro l l e r , OVSKernelSwitch ,
RemoteControl ler
from mininet . c l i import CLI
from mininet . l og import setLogLeve l
Switch = OVSKernelSwitch
def addHost ( net , N ) :
"Create host hN and add to net . "
name = 'h%d ' % N
ip = ' 10 .0 .0 .%d ' % N
return net . addHost ( name , ip=ip )
def mult iContro l l e rNet ( ) :
net = Mininet ( c o n t r o l l e r=RemoteControl ler , switch=Switch )
print " Creat ing c o n t r o l l e r s "
c1 = net . addContro l l e r ( ' c1 ' , port=6633 )
c2 = net . addContro l l e r ( ' c2 ' , port=6634 )
# network 1
print " Creat ing sw i t che s f o r zone 1"
s1 = net . addSwitch ( ' s1 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 " )
s2 = net . addSwitch ( ' s2 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 2 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 " )
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s3 = net . addSwitch ( ' s3 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 3 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 " )
s4 = net . addSwitch ( ' s4 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 4 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 4 " )
s5 = net . addSwitch ( ' s5 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 5 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 5 " )
s6 = net . addSwitch ( ' s6 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 6 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 6 " )
s7 = net . addSwitch ( ' s7 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 7 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 7 " )
s8 = net . addSwitch ( ' s8 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 8 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 8 " )
s9 = net . addSwitch ( ' s9 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 9 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 9 " )
s10 = net . addSwitch ( ' s10 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 a" , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 " )
print " Creat ing hos t s f o r zone 1"
senders1 = [ addHost ( net , n ) for n in 11 , 12 ]
a l t s e nd e r s 1 = [ addHost ( net , n ) for n in 13 , 14 ] # senders
a f t e r migrat ion
r e c e i v e r s 1 = [ addHost ( net , n ) for n in 15 , 16 ]
IDS = addHost ( net , 21)
AppFW = addHost ( net , 22)
DPI = addHost ( net , 23)
IDS2 = addHost ( net , 25)
AppFW2 = addHost ( net , 24)
# network 2
print " Creat ing sw i t che s f o r zone 2"
s31 = net . addSwitch ( ' s31 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 1 f " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 1 " )
s32 = net . addSwitch ( ' s32 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 0 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 2 " )
s33 = net . addSwitch ( ' s33 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 1 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 3 " )
s34 = net . addSwitch ( ' s34 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 2 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 4 " )
s35 = net . addSwitch ( ' s35 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 3 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 5 " )
s36 = net . addSwitch ( ' s36 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 4 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 6 " )
s37 = net . addSwitch ( ' s37 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 5 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 7 " )
s38 = net . addSwitch ( ' s38 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 6 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 8 " )
s39 = net . addSwitch ( ' s39 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 7 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 9 " )
s40 = net . addSwitch ( ' s40 ' , " 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 2 8 " , " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 4 0 " )
print " Creat ing hos t s f o r zone 2"
r e c e i v e r 2 = addHost ( net , 45 )
IDS3 = addHost ( net , 51)
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AppFW3 = addHost ( net , 52)
DPI3 = addHost ( net , 53)
# l i n k a g e zone 1
print " Creat ing l i n k s in zone 1"
[ s1 . l inkTo ( h ) for h in sender s1 ]
s1 . l inkTo ( s2 )
s2 . l inkTo ( s3 )
s3 . l inkTo ( s4 )
s4 . l inkTo ( s5 )
s5 . l inkTo ( s6 )
[ s6 . l inkTo ( h ) for h in r e c e i v e r s 1 ]
s4 . l inkTo ( s7 )
s7 . l inkTo ( s8 )
s8 . l inkTo ( s9 )
s9 . l inkTo ( s10 )
[ s9 . l inkTo ( h ) for h in a l t s e nd e r s 1 ]
s2 . l inkTo ( IDS )
s3 . l inkTo ( AppFW )
s5 . l inkTo ( DPI )
s7 . l inkTo ( AppFW2 )
s8 . l inkTo ( IDS2 )
# l i n k a g e in t e r zone
print " l i n k zone 1 zone 2"
s10 . l inkTo ( s31 )
# l i n k a g e zone 2
print " Creat ing l i n k s in zone 1"
s31 . l inkTo ( s32 )
s32 . l inkTo ( s33 )
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s33 . l inkTo ( s34 )
s34 . l inkTo ( s35 )
s35 . l inkTo ( s36 )
s36 . l inkTo ( s37 )
s35 . l inkTo ( s38 )
s38 . l inkTo ( s39 )
s39 . l inkTo ( s40 )
s32 . l inkTo ( IDS3 )
s33 . l inkTo ( AppFW3 )
s34 . l inkTo ( DPI3 )
s36 . l inkTo ( r e c e i v e r 2 )
# run
print " Sta r t i ng network"
net . bu i ld ( )
[ c o n t r o l l e r . s t a r t ( ) for c o n t r o l l e r in c1 , c2 ]
[ sw . s t a r t ( [ c1 ] ) for sw in s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 , s6 , s7 , s8 , s9 ,
s10 ]
[ sw . s t a r t ( [ c2 ] ) for sw in s31 , s32 , s33 , s34 , s35 , s36 , s37 ,
s38 , s39 , s40 ]
print " Running CLI"
CLI( net )
print " Stopping network"
net . stop ( )
i f name == ' ma in ' :
se tLogLeve l ( ' i n f o ' ) # for CLI output
mult iCont ro l l e rNet ( )
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APPENDICES C
send packets.py
#!/ usr / b in /env python
"""
This s c r i p t sends a c r a f t e d packe t marked wi th source 10 . 0 . 0 . 11
and ds t 10 . 0 . 0 . 15 tagged wi th AppID 2
by RaaverooK
"""
import array
import s t r u c t
import socke t
import f c n t l
from s t r u c t import 
SIOCGIFCONF = 0x8912 # de f i n e SIOCGIFCONF
BYTES = 4096 # de f i n e the by t e s i z e
# g e t i f a c e l i s t f unc t i on d e f i n i t i o n
# t h i s f unc t i on w i l l r e turn array o f a l l ' up ' i n t e r f a c e s
def g e t i f a c e l i s t ( ) :
# crea t e the sock e t o b j e c t to g e t the i n t e r f a c e l i s t
sck = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF INET, socke t .SOCKDGRAM)
# prepare the s t r u c t v a r i a b l e
names = array . array ( 'B ' , ' n0 '  BYTES)
# the t r i c k i s to g e t the l i s t from i o c t l
byte l en = s t r u c t . unpack ( ' iL ' , f c n t l . i o c t l ( sck . f i l e n o ( ) ,
SIOCGIFCONF, s t r u c t . pack ( ' iL ' , BYTES, names . b u f f e r i n f o ( ) [ 0 ] ) ) )
[ 0 ]
# conver t i t to s t r i n g
namestr = names . t o s t r i n g ( )
# return the i n t e r f a c e s as array
return [ namestr [ i : i +32] . s p l i t ( ' n0 ' , 1) [ 0 ] for i in range (0 ,
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byte len , 32) ]
# now , use the func t i on to ge t the ' up ' i n t e r f a c e s array
i f a c e s = g e t i f a c e l i s t ( )
# crea t e the sending socke t , b ind on the f i r s t i n t e r f a c e , u s u a l l y
in mininet f o r hos t h11 : h11 eth0
s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCKRAW)
s . bind ( ( i f a c e s [ 0 ] , 50007) )
# We' re pu t t i n g t o g e t h e r an e t h e rne t frame
# MAC and source address
s r c addr = "nx00nx00nx00nx00nx00nx0b"
dst addr = "nx00nx00nx00nx00nx00n x0f "
# the data
payload = ( " [ "30)+"PAYLOAD"+(" ] "30)
# ethe r t y p e IP
e ther type = "nx08nx00"
# vers ion , header l eng th , t o t a l l eng th , f l a g , t t l , proto ( udp )
ip1 = "nx46nx00nx00nx63nx00nx8anx40nx00nx40nx11"
ip checksum = "nx22nxe3"
# source and ds t ip
ip2 = "nx0anx00nx00nx0bnx0anx00nx00n x0f "
# app id
i p op t = "nx02nx02nx00nx02"
ip = ip1 + ip checksum + ip2 + ip opt
# port 50007 to 50007
UDP = "nxc3nx57nxc3nx57nx00nx40nx00nx00"
# send the packe t through the soc ke t
s . send ( dst addr+sr c addr+ether type+ip+UDP+payload )
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APPENDICES D
receive packets.py
#!/ usr / b in /python
"""
This s c r i p t l i s t e n s to incoming ip packe t s and d i s p l a y the src and
ds t when a packe t i s r e c e i v ed
by RaaverooK
"""
import socke t
from s t r u c t import 
#Convert a s t r i n g o f 6 charac t e r s o f e t h e rne t address in t o a dash
separa ted hex s t r i n g
def eth addr ( a ) :
b = "%.2x %.2x %.2x %.2x %.2x %.2x" % ( ord ( a [ 0 ] ) , ord ( a [ 1 ] ) , ord
( a [ 2 ] ) , ord ( a [ 3 ] ) , ord ( a [ 4 ] ) , ord ( a [ 5 ] ) )
return b
#crea t e an PACKET , RAW SOCKET
#l i s t e n s to a l l incoming e t h e rne t packe t s
s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET , socke t .SOCKRAW , socket .
ntohs (0 x0003 ) )
# rec e i v e a packe t
while True :
packet = s . recvfrom (65565)
#packe t s t r i n g from tup l e
packet = packet [ 0 ]
#parse e t h e rne t header
e th l eng th = 14
eth header = packet [ : e th l eng th ]
eth = unpack ( ' ! 6 s6sH ' , e th header )
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e th p r o t o c o l = socket . ntohs ( eth [ 2 ] )
#Parse IP packe t s (no ARP)
i f e th p r o t o c o l == 8 :
#Parse IP header
#take f i r s t 24 charac t e r s f o r the ip header ( c l a s s i c header +
op t ions )
i p heade r = packet [ e th l eng th :24+ e th l eng th ]
#now unpack them
iph = unpack ( ' !BBHHHBBH4s4sBBBB ' , ip heade r )
p ro to co l = iph [ 6 ]
# avo i rd ing ICMP
i f pro to co l != 1 :
s addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 8 ] ) ;
d addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 9 ] ) ;
#pr in t " r e c e i v ed packe t "
print " r e c e i v ed : " , s addr , " to : " , d addr
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APPENDICES E
middlebox.py
#!/ usr / b in /python
"""
Sc r i p t which reproduce the middlebox behav ior :
  s n i f f packe t s
  resend them
by RaaverooK
"""
import array
import s t r u c t
import socke t
import f c n t l
from s t r u c t import 
SIOCGIFCONF = 0x8912 # de f i n e SIOCGIFCONF
BYTES = 4096 # Simply d e f i n e the by t e s i z e
# g e t i f a c e l i s t f unc t i on d e f i n i t i o n
# t h i s f unc t i on w i l l r e turn array o f a l l ' up ' i n t e r f a c e s
def g e t i f a c e l i s t ( ) :
# crea t e the sock e t o b j e c t to g e t the i n t e r f a c e l i s t
sck = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF INET, socke t .SOCKDGRAM)
# prepare the s t r u c t v a r i a b l e
names = array . array ( 'B ' , ' n0 '  BYTES)
# the t r i c k i s to g e t the l i s t from i o c t l
byte l en = s t r u c t . unpack ( ' iL ' , f c n t l . i o c t l ( sck . f i l e n o ( ) ,
SIOCGIFCONF, s t r u c t . pack ( ' iL ' , BYTES, names . b u f f e r i n f o ( ) [ 0 ] ) ) )
[ 0 ]
# conver t i t to s t r i n g
namestr = names . t o s t r i n g ( )
# return the i n t e r f a c e s as array
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return [ namestr [ i : i +32] . s p l i t ( ' n0 ' , 1) [ 0 ] for i in range (0 ,
byte len , 32) ]
# now , use the func t i on to ge t the ' up ' i n t e r f a c e s array
i f a c e s = g e t i f a c e l i s t ( )
# crea t e a sock e t to l i s t e n to a r r i v i n g e t h e rne t packe t s
s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET , socke t .SOCKRAW , socket .
ntohs (0 x0800 ) )
# crea t e the sending sock e t which w i l l be used to re send the
s n i f f e d packets , mimicking a middlebox behav ior
sock = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCKRAW)
# we bind i t to the f i r s t i n t e r f a c e up , u s u a l l y in mininet f o r
hos t h11 : h11 eth0
sock . bind ( ( i f a c e s [ 0 ] , 50007) )
# rec e i v e a packe t
while True :
packet = s . recvfrom (65565)
#packe t s t r i n g from tup l e
packet = packet [ 0 ]
#parse e t h e rne t header
e th l eng th = 14
eth header = packet [ : e th l eng th ]
#unpack the i n f o
eth = unpack ( ' ! 6 s6sH ' , e th header )
e t h p r o t o c o l = socket . ntohs ( eth [ 2 ] )
#Parse IP packe t s (no ARP)
i f e th p r o t o c o l == 8 :
#take f i r s t 24 charac t e r s f o r the ip header ( r e gu l a r header +
op t ions )
i p heade r = packet [ e th l eng th :24+ e th l eng th ]
#now unpack them
iph = unpack ( ' !BBHHHBBH4s4sBBBB ' , ip heade r )
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p ro to co l = iph [ 6 ]
# avo id ing ICMP
i f pro to co l != 1 :
s addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 8 ] ) ;
d addr = socket . i n e t n t oa ( iph [ 9 ] ) ;
# pr in t out the in format ion about the packe t
print " re sent : " , s addr , " to : " , d addr
# resend i t
sock . send ( packet )
#pr in t " packe t re sen t "
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APPENDICES F
Tests - Flow entries inside the OFSs
ow-entries in s1
Rule 1
{ Match : from .11 to .15
{ Action : put tag IDS1, route to s2
Rule 2
{ Match : from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag IDS1, route to s2
Rule 3
{ Match : from .12 to .45
{ Action : put tag IDS1, route to s2
ow-entries in s2
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag IDS1
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to port IDS1
Rule 2
{ Match : inport IDS1, from .11 to .15
{ Action : put tag AppFW1, route to s3
Rule 3
{ Match : inport IDS1, from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag AppFW1, route to s3
Rule 4
{ Match : inport IDS1, from .12 to .45
{ Action : put tag AppFW1, route to s3
111
ow-entries in s3
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag AppFW1
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to port AppFW1
Rule 2
{ Match : inport AppFW1, from .11 to .15
{ Action : route to s4
Rule 3
{ Match : inport AppFW1, from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag DPI1, route to s4
Rule 4
{ Match : inport AppFW1, from .12 to .45
{ Action : put gtag \DPI", route to s4
ow-entries in s4
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag DPI1
{ Action : route to port s5
Rule 2
{ Match : from .11 to .15
{ Action : route to s5
Rule 3
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s5
ow-entries in s5
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag DPI1
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to port DPI1
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Rule 2
{ Match : from .11 to .15
{ Action : route to s6
Rule 3
{ Match : inport DPI1, from .12 to .16
{ Action : route to s6
ow-entries in s6
Rule 1
{ Match : from .11 to .15
{ Action : route to h15
Rule 2
{ Match : from .12 to .16
{ Action : route to h16
ow-entries in s7
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag AppFW2
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to port AppFW2
Rule 2
{ Match : inport AppFW2, from .11 to .15
{ Action : route to s4
Rule 3
{ Match : inport AppFW2, from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag DPI1, route to s4
Rule 4
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s8
ow-entries in s8
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Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag IDS2
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to port IDS2
Rule 2
{ Match : inport IDS2, from .11 to .15
{ Action : put tag AppFW2, route to s7
Rule 3
{ Match : inport IDS2, from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag AppFW2, route to s7
Rule 4
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s9
ow-entries in s9
Rule 1
{ Match : from .11 to .15
{ Action : put tag IDS2, route to s8
Rule 2
{ Match : from .12 to .16
{ Action : put tag IDS2, route to s8
Rule 3
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s10
Rule 4
{ Match : from .12 to .45
{ Action : put gtag \IDS", route to s10
ow-entries in s10
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Rule 1
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s31
Rule 2
{ Match : gtag \IDS", from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s31
ow-entries in s31
Rule 1
{ Match : gtag \IDS", from .12 to .45
{ Action : pop eel tag, put eel tag IDS3, route to s32
Rule 2
{ Match : gtag \DPI", from .12 to .45
{ Action : pop eel tag, put eel tag DPI3, route to s32
ow-entries in s32
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag IDS3
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to IDS3
Rule 2
{ Match : inport IDS3, from .12 to .45
{ Action : put eel tag AppFW3, route to s33
Rule 3
{ Match : eel tag DPI3,
{ Action : route to s33
ow-entries in s33
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag AppFW3
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to AppFW3
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Rule 2
{ Match : inport AppFW3, from .12 to .45
{ Action : put eel tag DPI3, route to s34
Rule 3
{ Match : eel tag DPI3,
{ Action : route to s34
ow-entries in s34
Rule 1
{ Match : eel tag DPI3
{ Action : pop eel tag, route to DPI3
Rule 2
{ Match : inport DPI3, from .12 to .45
{ Action : put eel tag DPI3, route to s35
ow-entries in s35
Rule 1
{ Match : from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s36
ow-entries in s36
Rule 1
{ Match : from .12 to .45
{ Action : route to s45
